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This thesis examines the Transition movement, a transnational network of local social movements,
as  an  instance  of  'the  politics  of  resistance'.  What  makes  this  combination  interesting  from a
theoretical point of view is the fact that the Transition movement, which focuses on community-
oriented processes of economic localisation, does not easily fit into widespread ideas of the politics
of  resistance  within  critical  International  Relations  theories.  It  also  does  not  reflect  traditional
understandings of social movements within IR literature due to its low-profile, everyday forms of
resistance.  As  such,  this  thesis  is  informed  by two  interrelated  purposes:  on  the  one  hand,  it
highlights  one  existing  alternative  of  how  we  could  organise  ourselves  and  our  economies  in
potentially 'postcapitalist' ways (a practical point), and on the other hand, it uses the analysis as a
way to broaden IR's understanding of social movements and the politics of resistance (a theoretical
point). 
The theoretical  and methodological  frameworks of  this  thesis  constitute  a  multiperspective and
multidisciplinary approach that  draws not  only on the key insights gained from several critical
theories within IR (i.e. green, neo-Gramscian and neo-Marxist, poststructuralist, and feminist), but
also on those gained from other related disciplines, such as political science, sociology, political
philosophy,  and  feminist  economic  geography.  The  theoretical  basis  is  complemented  with  a
narrative,  hermeneutic  methodology,  thus  creating  what  can  fittingly  be  termed  as  a  critical-
hermeneutic approach to the research.  Its  strength lies in the way that  it  not  only supports  the
practical and theoretical motivations underlying this thesis, but also allows to draw attention to
wider questions of disciplinary boundaries, power relations, and the very meaning and purpose of
International Relations.      
The combination of practical, theoretical and also methodological and disciplinary concerns has
been  translated  into  three  core  areas  of  analysis,  bound  together  by the  'hermeneutic  triad'  of
explication, (varieties of) explanation, and exploration, as well as a narrative research orientation
that embraces the researcher as an embodied and vulnerable observer. The first, empirical analysis
utilises  aspects  of  explication,  'subjectivist  explanation',  narrative  analysis,  frame  analysis  and
substantive  categories  to  examine the  core  criticisms,  strategies  and solutions  embodied  in  the
variety of materials produced by the Transition Network (an official 'umbrella' organisation for the
movement). The second, theoretical part produces an 'objectivist explanation' that demonstrates the
ways in which the Transition movement is, in fact, a form of politics of resistance and the ways in
which this analysis advances IR's understandings of social movements and the politics of resistance.
The third and final part combines aspects of exploration, 'constructivist explanation' and personal
narrative in order to interrogate the relationship between the research and my own identity and
positionality within it. 
The key finding of the empirical analysis is that the movement narrative embodies deep criticisms
of  particular  socio-cultural  and  (socio-)economic  structures  related  to  Western  modernity  (i.e.
individualistic, materialistic, and anthropocentric values, and the globalised, energy-intensive, and
growth-based economic system), and the inaction of political elites. As a response, it pursues what
can  be  fittingly  termed  as  the  optimistic  diplomacy  of  transitional  change  towards  economic
localisation  and  the  spread  of  cooperative  forms  of  production;  intrinsic  and  Earth-centred
(biocentric) values and worldviews; and the reconciliation of community empowerment and state
action.  More  theoretically,  the  movement  represents  'covert',  everyday resistance  to  some  core
aspects of globalisation, capitalism, scientific rationality, and modern masculinity. A key method of
resistance is transforming aspects of popular common sense through principled pragmatism and
positive direct action (termed as 'pragmatic prefigurativism'). The overall imaginary that emerges is
one of place-based globalism, described most tellingly as 'a global politics of local transformations'.
However,  rather  than  being  the  perfect  counterpart  of  the  various  theoretical  perspectives  and
concepts, a key insight of the analysis concerns the multifaceted and often contradictory nature of
resistance. This complexity and variety (including the local yet transnational character, the diverse,
non-confrontational methods, and the emphasis on the slow transformation of everyday economic
and social practices and mindsets) also contains the key to broadening common understandings of
social movements and the politics of resistance. 
The findings of the personal narrative, on the other hand, highlight the deep connections between
some key aspects of the research and my own identity and positionality, thus demonstrating the
embeddedness of values and worldviews in most of the research choices. It also draws attention to
the  benefits  of  using  theoretically  holistic  and  methodologically  critical-reflective  tools,  which
allow to draw strength from particular aspects of identity and personality. This part also reveals that
although the  three  different  analyses  focus  on three  different  aspects  of  the  research,  my own
subjectivity, personality, identity, and experience and knowledge base, are embodied in all of them.
The position of an 'embodied observer' does not therefore prevent from producing valid knowledge
of the topic in question.
Overall,  the broader implications underlying this  thesis concern the purposes and boundaries of
International  Relations  as  a  discipline.  Raising  questions  about  the  purposes  of  IR  research,
including its dominant ontological, epistemological, and methodological commitments has been a
way to engage in a personal politics of prefigurative resistance that strives for a less hierarchical and
more  inclusive  IR.  This  means  broadening  our  horizons  also  beyond  states  and  state-centric
research; acknowledging the partial and located nature of all knowledge claims and the benefits of
more collective, reflective, and holistic viewpoints; and being attentive to the situatedness of the
researcher and the various boundaries, marginalisations and relationships of power within research.
Only then can IR scholars begin to understand (and take part in) the various processes and methods
of radical change.  
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1. INTRODUCTION
For as long as I can remember, I have been preoccupied with the issue of change; in light of the
ongoing  ecological, economic, social and political crises,1 how can individual and collective human
behaviour be transformed in a way that results in a more ecologically sustainable, equal and just
world? Trying to answer this question has made me realise the interconnectedness of these crises –
particularly  that  one  cannot  understand  global  ecological  'issues'2 without  understanding  the
underlying economic, social, and political issues. Realising the interconnectedness of these areas of
human activity also helps to understand why change seems to be so hard to come by; why no
amount  of  public  protest3 or  ecological  destruction  seems  to  have  managed  to  transform  the
contemporary workings of liberal democracies, neoliberal globalisation, or the individualistic and
materialistic  mindsets  of  most  'consumer-citizens'.  The  ensuing  disillusionment  with  inter-state
politics and the more explicit forms of protest that actually legitimise states as the solution to most
of our problems has encouraged me to look elsewhere for alternative paths to change. This quest led
me to discover the Transition movement, characterised variously as a relocalisation movement (e.g.
Bailey, Hopkins & Wilson 2010); a grassroots movement (e.g. Hardt 2013); a grassroots innovation
and a 'transnational grassroots network' (Feola & Nunes 2014); a 'climate-related social innovation'
(Scott  Cato  & Hillier  2010);  a  social  experiment  (Haxeltine  & Seyfang 2009);  an  example  of
emerging 'sustainable communities' and a form of 'hands-on, DIY politics' (Barry & Quilley 2009);
and a radical social movement (e.g. Stevenson 2012). This thesis views the Transition movement as
a transnational network of local  social movements – understood for present purposes simply as
“collective attempts to promote or resist change in a society or group” (Benford, Gongaware &
Valadez 2000, 2712) – and a form of 'politics of resistance' that is responding to some of the most
pressing crises of our times by aiming to relocalise and downscale most aspects of human activity.
 
More  broadly,  the  Transition  movement  can  be  viewed as a  relatively high-profile  example  of
several relocalisation movements operating across the world. As argued by Bailey, Hopkins and
Wilson  (2010,  595),  it  represents  “a  radical  alternative  template  of  spatial  relations  to  that  of
1 For environmental perspectives, see e.g. Global Footprint Network 2014; IPCC 2012; Living Planet Report 2012;
Millennium Ecosystem Assessment 2005. For economic perspectives, see e.g. Harvey 2010; Patomäki 2012. For
social breakdown and a falling quality of life in affluent countries (related to materialistic value orientations), see
e.g. Lane 2000; Kasser 2002; Hamilton & Denniss 2005. For a crisis of representative politics, see e.g. Dalton 2004;
and also Roos 2012 for a passionate monograph of a Dutch scholar. 
2 Treating  global  environmental  problems  (e.g.  decreasing  biodiversity,  changing  and  increasingly  unpredictable
climate conditions,  decreasing quality of  atmospheric  conditions,  and  severe  stress  on ecosystem functions)  as
separate ‘issues’, without due regard for their interconnectedness, is exactly a major part of the problem.
3 See e.g. Ortiz et al. 2013 for the scale and common grievances of protests in recent years.
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globalisation” and the practices of neoliberal globalisation. The movement owes its origins to a full
time permaculture4 degree in Kinsale, Ireland, which in 2005 resulted in an 'Energy Descent Action
Plan'5 for Kinsale, produced by the students and the course instructor, Rob Hopkins. In 2006, with
the help of Hopkins and a local collaborator Naresh Giangrande, the first official 'Transition Town'
was established in Totnes (Devon, UK) and the idea quickly spread to other towns, neighbourhoods
and cities in the UK and elsewhere in the world, particularly in the West. (See e.g. Atkinson &
Viloria 2013, 582; Felicetti 2014, 2.) This also led, in 2006, to the establishment of the Transition
Network,  a  formal  'umbrella'  organisation  operating  legally  as  a  charity,  with  the  intention  of
bringing together the various local movements, or 'Transition initiatives', around the world. More
specifically, its stated aim is to “inspire, encourage, connect, support and train communities as they
self-organise around the Transition model” (Transition Network's Draft Strategy 2014, 1). It has
produced, particularly through Hopkins, a stream of publications (e.g. Hopkins 2008; 2011; 2013),
although  their  official  website  (http://www.transitionnetwork.org/)  contains  much  of  the  same
information. 
This work has led to the formation of Transition groups and initiatives first across the UK, then
spreading to North America and Australasia, followed by other parts of Europe, a growing network
in  Latin  America,  and  finally  a  number  of  initiatives  also  in  Asia  and  South  Africa  (see  e.g.
Atkinson & Viloria 2013, 583). As of September 2013, 462 'official' initiatives (and a further 654
'muller' initiatives) in 43 countries had registered themselves on the Transition Network website
(Transition  Initiatives  Map  2013),  although  it  is  unclear  how  many  of  them  have  remained
operational or how extensive or successful most of these have been. It is also notable that the great
majority of the initiatives seem to be located in Europe,  Northern America,  Australia and New
Zealand. However, this is hardly surprising since the original idea behind the Transition movement
was to be a form of 'detox' for the West (Hopkins blog entry 02.04.2014) and it is arguably the West
that certainly has a great need for it. This is not to claim that relocalisation processes would not be
beneficial also in poorer areas of the world – on the contrary, strengthening things such as local
infrastructure  and  food  production  for  local  use  strikes  as  highly  beneficial  also  in  so  called
developing regions.  
4 According to the movement's founder and core spokesperson, Rob Hopkins (2011, 98), the meaning of permaculture
has changed from its original meaning as 'permanent agriculture' (and the idea of modelling agricultural systems in
the way that natural systems function) to its more contemporary meaning as 'permanent culture'. This latter view
expands the focus from agriculture to designing whole ways of living in more sustainable ways.
5 According to Hopkins (2011, 235) an Energy Descent Plan is “a community Plan B” which focuses on how the
transition to a relocalised, low-carbon future could actually take place in a particular settlement. 
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In terms of the actual  content  of the 'Transition model',  it  can be viewed as a response to the
converging environmental (climate change), energy (oil) and economic crises (see e.g. Hardt 2013,
11). Indeed, existing research on the movement seems to be in considerable agreement over the core
issues  characteristic  of  the  movement,  namely  the  problems  of  peak  oil6,  climate  change,  and
economy providing  the  rationale  for  the  Transition  quest  for  community-based  'resilience'  and
'localisation'7 (see e.g. Barry & Quilley 2009; Bailey et al. 2010; Atkinson and Viloria 2013; Hardt
2013). As these goals require the commitment and active engagement of a great number of people
in any given settlement, the main role of the Transition initiatives has been to  act as 'catalysts' that
connect the various local actors around shared narratives. However, although such outlines are well
established, the more specific understandings, assumptions and contradictions underlying the core
issues seem to be far from clear.8 This is one key area of inquiry that this thesis aims to shine light
on. It will be argued that despite certain contradictions, the assumptions underlying the movement's
'grand narrative' represent a deeper resistance to some of the core features of Western modernity. 
This also returns us to the most central theoretical aspect of this thesis – that of the 'politics of
resistance'.  This  is  a  multidisciplinary  research  strand,  pursued  also  within  the  discipline  of
International Relations (IR), particularly by those within the tradition of critical theories (see e.g.
the edited collections of Gills 2000b and Eschle and Maiguashca 2005a). IR theorists and scholars
have generally tended to avoid 'social movements' and social movement theory, thinking of them as
the domain of sociology and the domestic, not one of IR and the international. Also, they have been
considered as operating in the social domain, separate from the political.  The 'anti-globalisation
movement'9 of the late 1990s and early 21st century arguably disrupted these assumptions, but even
now analyses have usually focused on non-governmental organisations, global civil society, global
governance, or the politics of resistance, rather than social movements  per se. (Eschle 2005, 17.)
The occasions when social movements have been analysed on their own right within international
relations  scholarship,  it  has  generally  taken  place  within  the  liberal-constructivist  research  on
'transnational social movements'  (see e.g Tarrow 2001;  Khagram, Riker & Sikkink 2002). What
these different analyses seem to have in common is their emphasis on high-profile, highly visible
forms of public protests, such as those carried out by the Zapatistas (see e.g. Morton 2002) or the
6 Peak oil refers to “the point when the maximum rate of global production is reached and begins its terminal decline”
(Chatterton & Cutler 2008, 2).
7 These are examined in further detailed in chapter 4.
8 One exception is the work of Haxeltine and Seyfang (2009) which compared academic understandings of the terms
transition and resilience to the way in which they are used in the movement rhetoric.
9 The movement has also been known as 'the movement of movements', the global justice movement, or the alter-
globalisation movement. This will be discussed to some extent in chapter 3 in the discussion on globalisation.
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related  'anti-globalisation  movement'  (see  e.g.  Gill  2000;  Chin  &  Mittelman  2000;  Eschle  &
Maiguashca  2005a, 2007).10 However, it is a key purpose of this thesis to use the analysis of the
Transition movement to  incorporate,  interrogate and develop traditional  understandings  of  both
social movements and the politics of resistance.    
Indeed, a core argument of this thesis is that the Transition movement represents a different kind of
'transnational' social movement and a different kind of politics of resistance (a constructive direct
action form based in everyday life) compared to the more explicitly political forms engaging in
public  protest  demonstrations  against  political  and economic  elites,  but  a  politics  of  resistance
nonetheless.11 The  seemingly  non-political,  community-oriented,  and  'social'  nature  of  the
movement may make it a strange choice for a student of IR, but I agree with Kulynych (1997, 337)
who asserts, citing Foucault (1980), 
what was formerly considered apolitical, or social rather than political, is revealed as the foundation
of  technologies  of  state  control.  Contests  over  identity and everyday social  life  are  not  merely
additions  to  the  realm  of  the  political,  but  actually  create  the  very  character  of  those  things
traditionally considered political. [...] Thus it is contestations at the micro-level, over the intricacies
of everyday life, that provide the raw material for global domination, and the key to disrupting global
strategies of domination. Therefore, the location of political participation extends [...] to the intimacy
of daily actions and iterations.
Thus, the political importance of everyday resistance that challenges the way people think and act in
their  normal  life  cannot  be overstated.  And when replicated in  sufficiently many locations,  the
changes  in  mindsets  and behaviours  can soon gain  global  importance that  clearly has  political
consequences. 
In order to delve into the politics of resistance of the Transition movement and the way in which it
can  help  to  develop  these  strands  of  research,  I  have  adopted  a  multiperspective  and
multidisciplinary approach that  draws not  only on the key insights gained from several critical
theories within IR (i.e. green, neo-Gramscian and neo-Marxist, poststructuralist, and feminist), but
also  those  gained  from other  related  disciplines,  such  as  political  science,  sociology,  political
philosophy, and feminist economic geography. Discussions on politics, power and resistance as well
as the concepts of prefigurative direct action and place-based globalism are included in order to
10 Interestingly, I have not yet found a single 'politics of resistance' analysis of the Occupy movement that swept across
the world in 2011–2012. 
11 A part of the motivation to examine the Transition movement as an instance of the politics of resistance came from
an encounter with one of my teachers who commented that  the two did not really fit  together. I was surprised
because,  from my point  of  view,  there  was  no  question  about  it.  This  made  me wonder  about  the  dominant
assumptions related to the politics of resistance and only served to strengthen the desire to examine the relationship
of these two in the process of this thesis.  
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develop  a  broader  understanding  of  the  politics  of  resistance  in  the  context  of  the  Transition
movement. This theoretical basis is complemented with a narrative, hermeneutic methodology (the
topic of chapter three), thus creating what can fittingly be termed as a critical-hermeneutic approach
to the research. Its strength lies in the way that it supports both practical and theoretical motivations
underlying this thesis – the practical interest in understanding and drawing attention to one existing
alternative of how we could organise ourselves and our economies in potentially 'postcapitalist'
ways, and the critical-theoretical interest in 'explaining' the movement through the theoretical lenses
which also allow broadening IR's understanding of social movements and the politics of resistance.
The theoretical and methodological choices also reflect a desire to draw attention to wider questions
of  disciplinary boundaries,  power relations,  and the very meaning and purpose of International
Relations.       
  
The key research questions that emerge from this combination of elements are: What are the core
criticisms, strategies and solutions embodied in the Transition narrative?12 How is the Transition
movement  a  form of  politics  of  resistance  and  how can  this  case  study  help  to  advance  IR's
understanding of social movements and the politics of resistance? And finally, how does my own
identity and positionality interact with the research? In order to answer these, this thesis proceeds
as follows. First, chapter two will present and discuss the theoretical frameworks of this thesis in
further detail. It begins with a discussion of the role of non-state actors in IR research, especially the
emergence of social movements and other similar actors. This is followed by a discussion on critical
theories and the epistemological, ontological, political and normative commitments that they hold.
Finally, some key concepts and critical IR theories on the politics of resistance are considered and
complemented with relevant concepts from related social science disciplines. 
Secondly, chapter three presents the methodological considerations of this thesis and the research
material used. These refer most of all to a narrative research orientation that confounds the classical
IR distinction between explaining and understanding (e.g. Hollis & Smith 1990); the 'hermeneutic
triad' of explication, (varieties of) explanation, and exploration as key methods, complemented by a
number  of  other  analytical  and  categorisation  methods;  and  the  selected  publications  of  the
Transition Network that these methods of analysis will be applied to.
12 Two things need to be noted here: 1) The reference to 'the Transition narrative' refers mostly to my interpretation of
the research  material  as  a  kind  of  grand narrative  (i.e.  that  first  there  is  a  particular  state  of  affairs,  then  the
Transition movement comes along, and the end result is a changed state of affairs); and 2) the research question
itself  does  not  refer  only to  the  immediately explicit  aspects,  but  more  importantly to  the  understandings  and
assumptions underlying the surface narrative. 
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Thirdly,  chapter four contains the empirical, qualitative analysis of the Transition narrative, and
chapter five reconstructs and re-examines the analysis through the critical-theoretical conceptual
vocabulary  of  the  politics  of  resistance.  This  chapter  also  considers  the  contributions  of  this
research to IR's understanding of social movements and the politics of resistance. The subsequent
chapter six then constitutes an 'exploration' of identity and positionality in the research process, in
line  with  critical  theories'  commitment  to  critical-theoretical  and  emancipatory  knowledge
interests.13 Finally,  chapter  seven  presents  the  conclusions  and  discusses  some  limitations  and
suggestions for further research.  
2. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORKS
This chapter on the theoretical frameworks relevant to this thesis covers a fairly broad array of
theoretical discussions and perspectives. It begins with a discussion on the role of non-state actors
in IR research, especially the emergence of interest in 'transnational social movements' and other
similar actors. Attention will be drawn to the limited nature of popular conceptualisation of said
actors and the need for broader understandings. This is followed by a discussion on critical theories
and the related epistemological, ontological, political and normative commitments that also inform
the conduct of this thesis. Finally, the terms resistance, politics, and power are examined in further
detail before introducing more specific theoretical perspectives on the politics of resistance. The
green, neo-Gramscian and neo-Marxist, poststructuralist, and feminist ways of making sense of the
politics of resistance are complemented by multidisciplinary perspectives on 'place-based globalism'
and 'prefigurative' thought and practice. I have chosen this combination of theoretical approaches
for a number of reasons. Firstly, I find the epistemological, ontological, political and normative
commitments that characterise critical theories particularly appealing. Secondly, it is my view that
each of these  theoretical perspectives hold some key insights for understanding the contradictory
and multiple character of the Transition movement as well as much of 21st century (post)modern
activism in the Western world, but none of the theories are quite sufficient on their own. Also, this
multiperspective  approach allows me to demonstrate  how all  knowledge claims  are partial  and
located,  but  how their  combination  and dialogue can  help  to  create  a  more  holistic,  collective
conception  of  a  phenomenon,  even  if  it  will  always  remain  rooted  in  particular  geo-historical
circumstances.  
13 For a more detailed discussion, see for example chapter 2.2.
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2.1. International Relations and transnational social movements 
As well known, International Relations has traditionally been known for its state-centric approach
to world politics. However,  at  least  since the publication of Robert  Keohane and Joseph Nye’s
edited book Transnational Relations and World Politics in 1971 and the simultaneous emergence of
the field of International Political Economy (IPE), also non-state actors gradually became a subject
of interest for many IR scholars. Up until the 1990’s, non-state actors were considered mainly in
economic terms and research focused largely on transnational economic relations and particularly
on the multinational corporation. (Tarrow 2001, 3–4.) It was not until the fading of the Cold War
and  the  enormous  growth  of  transnational  non-governmental  organisations  (NGOs)  that  many
scholars (see e.g. Keck & Sikkink 1998; Risse, Ropp & Sikkink 1999) began to fully recognize that
much  of  transnational  organising  was  activist-based  and  dealt  with  a  variety  of  political  and
humanitarian questions (Tarrow 2001, 4–5). This realisation was accompanied with a more general
discovery  of  ‘constructivism’ –  the  role  of  human  consciousness  in  international  life,  with  a
particular focus on the role of shared ideas and norms in world politics (Finnemore & Sikkink 2001,
393)  –  which  can  be  seen  as  the  traditional  uniting  force  between  IR  scholars  and  those  of
contentious politics (Tarrow 2001, 5–7). Indeed, while some academics in IR began to analyse more
deeply the development of international norms and the role of political  actors in producing the
intersubjective  understandings  that  constitute  norms,  social  movement  scholars  interested  in
contentious politics studied the collective beliefs, also described as transnational norms or collective
action  frames, produced  and  held  by  transnational  social  movements,  advocacy networks,  and
advocacy coalitions (Khagram et al. 2002, 15; Payne 2001, 37–38).  
     
Furthermore, at least four main sources of real-world politics have worked to blend International
Relations and social movement research since the 1990s: local grassroots insurgencies such as the
Zapatista movement that arose in Chiapas, Mexico from 1994 onwards; international protest events
such as the ‘Battle of Seattle’ in 1999 by the anti-globalisation movement; the successful outcomes
of  the  work  done by some transnational  activist  coalitions;  and the  presence  and influence  of
activism (mainly in the form of transnational non-governmental organisations) within and around
international  institutions  (Tarrow  2001,  8–9).  According  to  Tarrow  (2001,  9),  the  early  cross-
fertilisation  of  the  work  done  by  IR  scholars  interested  in  transnational  relations  and  social
movement specialists interested in transnational contention led to at least five different directions:
some focused on the development of a wide array of transnational civil actors (e.g. Risse-Kappen
1995a); some studied particular movements and movement families, such human rights movements
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(e.g. Risse et al. 1999); some concentrated on organisations (e.g. Keck & Sikkink 1998); others
analysed international treaties that have worked to legitimise and support different non-state actors
and  which  activists  either  influenced  or  mobilised  against  (e.g.  Ayers  1998);  and  others  again
focused on bi-national or regional contention involving international agreements or institutions (e.g.
Imig & Tarrow 2000). What this early research demonstrated was that transnational activism plays
an  important  role  in  the  shaping world  politics  (primarily  through  its  ability  to  transform
international norms), thus further obscuring the divisions between domestic and global levels of
politics (Khagram et al. 2002, 4) as well as influencing some of the key outcomes in international
relations14 (Price 2003, 591). These conclusions have been demonstrated (and questioned) many
times over in the last 15 years or so, more recently in the various chains of events arising from, for
example, the Arab Spring, the various Occupy movements around the world15, and most recently,
the Euromaidan, a series of public protests in Ukraine whose final outcome is still undecided.  
 
Within this constellation of collective actors, it is social movements and transnational networks of
movements that are of particular relevance for this thesis. However, it seems that much of the IR
literature on 'transnational social movements' is based on a highly limited understandings of said
actors.  For  example,  in  Tarrow's  well-known  formulation,  transnational  social  movements  are
defined as 
socially mobilized groups with constituents in at least two states, engaged in sustained contentious
interaction with powerholders in at least one state other than their own, or against an international
institution, or a multinational economic actor (Tarrow 2001, 11; see also Tarrow 2011, 6–7).   
In comparison, a slightly more expansive understanding is espoused by Khagram and colleagues,
who assert that
transnational  social  movements  are  sets  of  actors with common purposes and solidarities  linked
across  country  boundaries  that  have  the  capacity  to  generate  coordinated  and  sustained  social
mobilization in more than one country to publicly influence social change (Khagram et al. 2002, 8).
However,  even  they  then  go  on  to  emphasise  movements'  abilities  at  joint  mobilisation and
disruption (ibid.),  thus  confirming the seemingly popular  image of  social  movements  engaging
mostly in protest demonstrations. Such conceptualisations, although understandable in light of the
explicitly the examples of protest mentioned above, seem to contribute to an impoverishment of
imagination and understanding. As suggested by Vrasti, contemporary “IR scholars cannot explain,
14  One major example would be the end of the Cold War (see e.g. Risse-Kappen 1995b).  
15 See for example Bennett (2012, 31–35 ) for the impact of Western Occupy movements in shaping the political
agendas and discourses of the time. 
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understand or even imagine radical change, despite our professional training and despite the noble
ambitions that have inspired many of us to go into academia” (Vrasti 2012, 121). Radical change
here does not refer to political demands that lead to reform or revolution, but rather to a more
fundamental  questioning  of  dominant  structural  or  systemic  logics  that  may  lead  to  their
transformation.  It is the very impoverishment of imagination, the widespread inability to recognise
any resistance as meaningful or relevant to IR unless it directly confronts international political or
economic actors, that echoes in Vrasti's diagnosis of most IR scholarship.   
In  contrast,  I  began  this  thesis  with  a  considerably  more  open  ended  understanding  of  social
movements as “collective attempts to promote or resist change in a society or group” (Benford,
Gongaware & Valadez 2000, 2712). Transnational social movements could simply be considered as
those whose visions, concerns, or activities extend beyond particular locales or nation-states. The
main  benefit  of  this  expanded  understanding  is  that  it  is  not  loaded  with  necessities  such  as
'sustained  contentious  interaction'  with  predetermined  targets  (i.e.  'powerholders',  international
institutions, or  multinational economic actors) or with the requirements of joint mobilisation and
disruption.  Similarly,  I  would  argue that  having participants  in  two or  more countries  is  not  a
prerequisite  for  characterising  a  movement  as  'transnational'  –  in  a  globalised  world,  almost
everything has  global  or  transnational  relevance,  not  to  mention  a  transnational  audience.  The
concept of place-based globalism, as elaborated on by Julie Graham and Katherine Gibson (Gibson-
Graham 2008), transcends these issues by drawing attention to the global relevance of local action.
It is particularly useful when examining the Transition movement, a transnational network of locally
based  social  movements,  which  does  not  easily  fit  into  the  existing,  preconcieved  limits  of
transnational social movements. I will elaborate on this concept in section 2.3.4.
Furthermore, the interest in social movements and other similar actors as an object of IR research  is
also evident in more critical strands of IR theorising. The edited collections of Gills (2000b) and
Eschle  and  Maiguashca  (2005a)  can  be  viewed  as  prominent  representatives  of  the  efforts  to
develop  the  particular  strand  of  critical  IR research  that  focuses  on  'the  politics  of  resistance'
However,  conceptualising  what  this  term entails  seems to  be  far  from straightforward  as  each
theoretical 'school' has its own, often implicit, occasionally explicit, ideas of the subject matter. As a
core rationale for this thesis is to draw insights from and contribute to this strand of research, the
next sections will take a closer look at critical theories and the multiple ways of conceptualising the
politics of resistance. 
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2.2. Critical theories and the related epistemological, ontological, political and
normative considerations 
Before delving into the politics  of resistance,  a necessary word about  critical  IR theories16.  As
argued by Robert Cox (1981, 128, emphasis in the original), ”[t]heory is always for someone and
for some purpose” and generally serves one of two distinct purposes: 
One is simple, direct response: to be a guide to help solve the problems posed within the terms
of the particular perspective […]. The other is more reflective upon the process of theorising
itself: to become more clearly aware of the perspective which gives rise to theorising, and its
relationship to other perspectives (to achieve a perspective on perspectives); and to open up
the possibility of choosing a different valid perspective from which the problematic becomes
one of creating an alternative world. (Ibid.)
According  to  Cox,  the  first  purpose  corrensponds  to  problem-solving  theory which  takes  the
prevailing institutions and social and power relationships for granted and, in fact, aims to make
them work as smoothly as possible. The second purpose, on the other hand, gives rise to  critical
theory which calls into question the very same institutions and social and power relationships that
problem-solving theory takes for granted. Furthermore, while problem-solving theory is concerned
with addressing problems usually within a single area of specialisation, critical theory is oriented
towards a more holistic understanding of the subject at hand. (Cox 1981, 128–129.) Although such
a dichotomy carries with itself the idea that one (critical theory) is better than the other (problem-
solving theory), both are of course needed. While critical theory is more tuned to long-term change,
problem-solving theory is particularly useful when the timeframe for action is short. Nevertheless,
as this thesis is motivated by a desire for more fundamental changes in politics, economics and
social relationships and is guided by the view that the researcher him/herself is a part of this very
process, critical theory emerges as the unquestionable basis of this research.     
Furthermore, Eschle and Maiguashca (2007, 285) provide a useful description of critical theories as
those of Marxist, Gramscian, Habermasian, poststructuralist, postcolonial and feminist persuasion,
although  I  would  argue  that  many  green  theories  should  be  added  to  this  list.  Eschle  and
Maiguashca  also  make  an  attempt  at  a  broad  definition  of  critical  theories:  At  the  level  of
epistemology, these theories expose the social and historical nature of what has become common
sense, and illuminate the relationship between knowledge and power. This also involves critically
reflecting on the research process and the impact of the researcher. At the level of ontology and the
political, critical theories explore the relations of domination and oppression and the ways in which
16 I use the term critical theories – plural and lower case – to distinguish it from the Critical Theory more specifically,
although not exclusively, associated with the Frankfurt School.
10
concrete social struggles seek to overturn them. Finally, at the normative level, critical theories tend
to  have  an  emancipatory,  critical  knowledge  interests  that  make  them  essentially  a  form  of
politicised scholarship. (Ibid.) Although this thesis is informed by all of these elements, the aspect
of domination is particularly notable because it plays a role also in the methods of analysis. Rather
than  accepting  the  single-handed  legitimacy  of  the  logico-scientific  form  of  analysis  and
presentation,  this  thesis also incorporates a personal narrative as its  own form of self-liberating
practise (discussed in further detail in chapter three). As such, it is influenced by (poststructuralist)
feminist thought and research ethic (see e.g. Ackerley & True 2008).   
2.3. The politics of resistance deconstructed: Resistance, politics, power 
As argued by Eschle and Maiguashca (2007, 285), the growing critical-theoretical literature in IR
that deals specifically with the politics of resistance, understood as the domain of social movements,
civil  society  and  so  forth,  has  remained  surprisingly  underdeveloped  both  empirically  and
theoretically.  The essential  elements  in  conceptualising  resistance –  what,  why,  and how – are
usually expressed somewhat  implicitly rather  than explictly.  For a  clearer  understanding of  the
possible dimensions of what constitutes resistance, multidisciplinary social science research is a
useful  starting point.  For example,  Hollander  and Einwohner (2004) examined several  hundred
social  science articles  and books from 1995–2004 in which resistance was a key theoretical  or
empirical topic. Although disagreements abounded in the literature, the authors were able to create a
seven-part  typology  of  resistance  which  included  1)  overt  resistance;  2)  covert  resistance;  3)
unwitting  resistance;  4)  target-defined  resistance;  5)  externally-defined  resistance;  6)  missed
resistance; and 7) attempted resistance. All of these included some activity that can be perceived as
oppositional – meaning that they strive to change, question or pose a challenge to something – but
they varied according to the intent of the resistor and whether the target(s) or observer(s)  were
likely to recognise the activity as a form of opposition.
More specifically, overt resistance represents the concensual core of the term; it is intentional and
visible oppositional behaviour that is  readily recognized as such by both targets and observers.
Covert resistance, on the other hand, refers to oppositional activities that are intentional and can be
recognised  by  culturally  aware  observers,  but  are  not  necessarily  recognised  by  the  targets.
(Hollander  & Einwohner  2004,  545.)  The  following three  types  –  unwitting  resistance,  target-
defined resistance, externally-defined resistance – represent forms of resistance that are, in fact,
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unintentional. Unwitting resistance is behaviour that is perceived as threatening by both targets and
observers;  target-defined resistance is behaviour that is perceived threatening by targets but not
observers; and externally-defined resistance is behaviour that is perceived threatening by observers,
but  not  targets.  Finally,  missed  resistance is  oppositional  behaviour  that  is  intentional  and
recognised by targets but not observers, and attempted resistance is intentional but not recognised
by either targets or observers. (Hollander & Einwohner 2004, 545–546). Although not all of these
are  relevant  for  the  task  at  hand,  it  is  still  useful  to  comprehend  that  resistance  is  a  highly
multifaceted phenomenon that cannot be reduced to public protest demonstrations. 
   
More problematically, this fairly simplistic typology also has its downfalls. For one, it seems to take
for granted that the 'targets' of resistance are conscious actors (whether collective or individual).
How can, for example,  feminist  resistance against masculine values be perceived by 'the target'
when the target is present everywhere and can hardly be easily defined? Nevertheless, what this
exploration of resistance seems to offer for this thesis is, more than anything, a recognition that
striving for change is inherently a form of resistance, a challenge to or a questioning of something,
whatever  it  may  be  in  a  given  context.  Another  insight  is  that  non-confrontational,  'everyday
resistance'  (understood  as  covert  resistance),  which  often  goes  unnoticed  by  the  traditionally
powerful, can still be viewed as a meaningful form of resistance. It often draws on 'low-profile
techniques' and therefore ”helps to protect the powerless from repression by masking the resistant
nature of their activities” (Hollander & Einwohner 2004, 539). I will return to this discussion in
chapter 5.   
In addition to the question of what is resistance, the question of what is politics seems to be mostly
left  untouched in  the  IR literature  on  the  politics  of  resistance.  Teivainen (2007,  74)  relies  on
Roberto Mangabeira Unger's two definitions of politics in his discussion of the World Social Forum.
While  the  narrow  meaning  of  politics  refers  to  the  ”conflict  over  the  mastery  and  uses  of
governmental power”, a more broad understanding sees politics as the ”struggle over the resources
and arrangements that set the basic terms of our practical and passionate relations” (Unger 1987,
145–146).  A perhaps  clearer  definition,  although  referring  essentially  to  the  same elements,  is
provided by Jones (2013) who characterises politics as associated ”(1) with civil government, the
state, and public affairs; (2) with human conflict and its resolution; or (3) with the sources and
excercise of power”. Although this definition is useful in broadening the traditional understanding
of politics as the realm of political parties and nation-states, it also begs the question of what is
power  – a question that is obviously central to the concept of a politics of resistance, but is also
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rarely explicitly elaborated on (see Maiguashca 2006 for an exception). 
In order to gain a fairly quick understanding of the term, Haurgaard's (2010) discussion strikes as
useful. He argues that power is best viewed through four dimensions which have traditionally been
considered as  forms  of  domination,  but  can also be used as  forms of  empowerment.  The first
dimension, as understood by Dahl (1957) and Weber, Gerth and Mills (1948), is the classical power
as  power  over –  the  ability  of  A to  make B do what  B would  not  otherwise  do.  The  second
dimension of power is two-dimensional and refers, for example, to the way in which certain actors
are better positioned within or better able to manipulate the relevant  structural conditions in their
favour.  The third dimension of  power refers  to  the  culturally taken-for-granted reproduction of
social  structures  of  power  and  privilege  by  social  actors  themselves.  Finally,  in  the  fourth
dimension, power is viewed as a network of social relations (a Foucauldian conception of power)
where compliance is internalised. (Haugaard 2011.) 
Another  way to  conceptualise  power  comes  from Maiguashca  (2006)  who  discusses  the  term
explicitly in the context of social movements and critical IR theory. She draws out three 'modalities'
of power: material, discursive, and ideological: 
Material power refers to those practices and capacities that explicitly and materially constrain
or enable our bodies and behaviour. The expression of this modality of power is often, but not
always, coercive in nature and is exercised in a range of contexts, that is, statist (for example,
police, army), legislative (for example, national or international law), economic (for example,
capital)  or  family  (for  example,  wife  battery).  Discursive  power  includes  not  only  the
language  that  we  use  to  speak  and  write  about  particular  subjects,  but  also  the  cultural
metaphors, stereotypes and representations that sustain our commonsense understanding of
the world. Lastly, ideological power refers to the ideas, beliefs and normative values that we
hold  which  can,  and  often  does,  exceed  the  language  and  metaphors  that  we  employ.
(Maiguashca 2006, 251–252.)  
In  comparing  the  two  conceptualisations  of  power,  it  would  seems  that  Haugaard's  first  two
dimensions relate mainly to the material power identified by Maiguashca and the latter two to the
discursive  and  ideological  aspects  identified  by  Maiguashca.  Most  of  all,  the  discursive  and
ideological  modalities  of  power  seem  to  relate  closely  to  the  culturally  taken-for-granted
reproduction of social structures of power and privilege.
These insights will be discussed further in the following sections which take a closer look at some
of the green, neo-Gramscian and neo-Marxist, poststructuralist, and feminist ways of making sense
of the politics of resistance and the ontological assumptions that they hold about politics, resistance,
and power. After discussing some prominent examples of each of these approaches within IR, I then
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introduce and discuss two elements that are rarely,  and even then only implicitly present in IR
theorising; those of 'place-based globalism' and 'prefigurative' thought and practice. 
2.3.1. Green perspective: The power structures of world politics 
Considering that the Transition movement began in many ways as an environmental movement, a
specifically green perspective is warranted, provided in this case by Matthew Paterson's green IR
theory. According to Paterson (2001, 40), the appropriate targets of a politics of (environmental)
resistance are four,  interrelated power structures  of world politics:  the state  system,  capitalism,
(scientific,  technocratic)  knowledge,  and  patriarchy.  He  defines  the  state  system  as  ”the
consolidation of institutional complexes of power around territorially defined states” (op. cit. 42),
characterised by the ecologically problematic dynamics of state-building (territorially defined war-
making  and  identity  construction  as  well  as  market-based  accumulation  to  resource,  fund  and
legitimise the state), military competition, environmental displacement, and the naturalisation of
hierarchy also in other areas of social life (Paterson 2001, 42–45). Capitalism, on the other hand, is
defined as a social system based on the commodification of labour for the extraction of surplus
value. The core problem, as per Paterson, is that a capitalist economic system is characterised by its
requirements of growth (a lack of growth in the scale of the economy is by definition a crisis, a
recession), commodification, profit maximisation, and inequality on a global scale (op. cit. 45–50).
Paterson  defines  the  third  power  structure,  knowledge,  more  specifically  as  modern  scientific
rationality. This is characterised particularly by the presumed human-nature duality which has made
the natural world an object of instrumental use ('natural resources'), studied through reductionist
methodologies that fail to account for the crucial interactions between things, and the dominance of
scientific rationality and legitimacy. This latter aspects has translated to control over environments
and areas being given to particular elites and 'experts' rather than the communities that depend on
them (op. cit. 50–51). Finally, Paterson's fourth power structure, patriarchy, refers more specifically
to  the  ideals  of  modern  masculinity.  This  entails  the  values  of  individualism,  instrumental
rationality, and domination (hierarchy) prevalent in modern masculinity, replicated in the way that
the  main polluters  –  mostly affluent,  white,  Western men – are  able  to  displace  the  effects  of
environmental problems primarily to women, non-Westerners and ethnic minorities (op. cit. 51–52).
The implications that this theory holds for conceptualising the politics of resistance are multiple. It
seems reasonable to argue that resistance is essentially any activity that poses a challenge to the
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above-mentioned power structures (whether material, discursive or ideological in form); politics is
understood expansively as not the sole  territory of states  and oppositional  behaviour  related to
states, but also as a question of resisting both external and internal sources of power: and power
itself is clearly understood broadly, including material, discursive and ideological forms. However,
the emphasis is on a structural understanding of power and its the material consequences, and less
on a Foucauldian, network form of power where power is pervasive and in many ways inescapable.
2.3.2. Neo-Gramscian and other neo-Marxist perspectives: Resistance to neoliberal
globalisation
Neo-Gramscian and other Marxist-influenced conceptualisations of the politics of resistance can be
seen to represent the contemporary 'common sense' of the topic and they thus represent the view
against  which  nearly  all  of  the  subsequent  critical  theory  perspectives  position  themselves.
Essentially, these perspectives tend to concentrate on what in Hollander and Einwohner's typology
was termed as overt resistance, a form of resistance that can hardly be mistaken for anything else.
As such,  it  reflects  a  view where  forces  of  power  are  contrasted  with less  powerful  forces  of
resistance and it is the act of opposition, the demands placed on political and economic power that
makes them political. The core idea is one where social movements and other forces arising from
(global) civil society – the realm seemingly separate from political and economic realms, but also
inevitably intertwined with them (see e.g. Cox 1999; Gill 2000) – are seen as potential counter-
hegemonic  actors,  who  are  resisting  the  causes  and  consequences  of  neoliberal  economic
globalisation  (see  e.g.  Gills  2000a;  Chin  and  Mittelman  2000;  Morton  2002;  Birchﬁeld  and
Freyberg-Inan 2005; Gill 2008). Although the Transition movement's approach to change does not
neatly  fit  such  conceptualisations  of  resistance,  these  perspectives  can  nonetheless  provide
important insights into the historical context under which many social movements have emerged in
the  last  20  years  or  so  and some of  the  core  'targets'  of  resistance  prevalent  in  most  of  these
movements.  A Gramscian  influenced  analysis,  particularly  the  concept  of  common  sense,  also
infuses with this historical context and helps to understand the politics of resistance embodied in the
Transition approach. 
To fully understand the historical context of the Transition movement,  one cannot avoid a brief
discussion  on  globalisation.  Although  definitions  vary  considerably,  globalisation  can  be
understood as a  threefold process.  Economic globalisation refers primarily to the spread of the
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neoliberalism, an ideology and economic orthodoxy of market liberalisation, 'free trade', financial
deregulation,  privatised  public  services,  and  so  on  (translating  to  the  increasing  power  of
transnational corporations)17; political globalisation signifies the formation of international politico-
economic and military collectives (such as the EU, WTO, and NATO) which operate, in some ways,
above the nation state; and cultural globalisation suggests an intensifying global consciousness and
global social interrelatedness, especially through new technological developments (i.e. the internet)
and, for an affluent minority, easier travel across countries and continents (see e.g. Juppi, Peltokoski
&  Pyykkönen  2003,  275;  Eschle  2002,  316).  However,  when  neo-Marxist  scholars  refer  to
globalisation,  they  are  generally  referring  to  the  processes  of  economic  globalisation,  or
neoliberalism.  Gradually adopted  by the  Nixon administration  in  the  early 1970s,  aggressively
championed by the Reagan–Thatcher coalition, strengthened by the oil crisis of 1973, the 1980s
foreign debts crises, and the collapse of Soviet communism in 1989–1991 (all contributing to the
increased power of the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank (WB) and international
capital, the biggest drivers of neoliberal economics), neoliberalism was by the early 1990s heralded
as the only game in the political, global town (see e.g. Green & Griffth 2002, 50–52).   
However, the 1990s also became characterised by an increasing opposition to the neoliberal form of
economic globalisation. Although the separation of politics and (the supposedly neutral) economics
has  been  one  of  the  ways  in  which  democratic  calls  for  change  have  been  contained  under
neoliberalism or 'global capitalism' (see e.g. Teivainen 2007), many people have acknowledged and
opposed  the  undemocratic  nature  of  global  institutions  and  the  lack  of  accountability  of
transnational  corporations.  Around  the  world,  resistance  to  the  neoliberal  world  order  has
materialised in many forms, such as Islamic fundamentalism, the resurgence of nationalist (and
protectionist)  politics  in  many postcommunist  states,  and  food  riots  and  the  election  of  leftist
governments in Latin America. In addition, social resistance has also materialised in the form of
transnational activism. Labour unions, environmental organisations, indigenous groups and various
other transnationally connected  groups have organised to protest neoliberal policies. (Roberts 2008,
328–329, 341; Escobar 2010, 7–8.) 
17 A more comprehensive characterisation of neoliberal economic globalisation is provided, for example, by Gills who 
argues that four processes are present simultaneously: 
“1   protection of the interests of capital and expansion of the processes of capital accumulation on world scale;
  2  a tendency towards homogenisation of state policies and state forms to render them instrumental to the protection of
capital and the process of capital accumulation on a world scale, via a new 'market ideology';
  3  the formation and expansion of a new tier of transnationalized institutional authority above the state's, which has the
aim and purpose of re-articulating states to the purposes of facilitating global capital accumulation; and
  4  the political exclusion of dissident social forces from the arena of state policy-making, in order to desocialize the 
subject and insulate the neoliberal state form against the societies over which they preside, thus facilitating the 
socialization of risk on behalf of capital.” (Gills 2000a, 4.)
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Many of these movements came together in the late 1990s and the first decade of the 21 st century in
the 'movement of movements',  called by the media as the anti-globalisation movement.  Its  key
defining moment may have been the ‘Battle of Seattle’ in 1999 where roughly 50.000 demonstrators
protested  against  the  third  World  Trade  Organisation  (WTO)  Ministerial  meeting  designed  for
increasing  market  liberalisation  (della  Porta  et  al.  2006,  1;  Edelman  2009,  111).  From Seattle
onwards, all  of the major international summits (in Genoa, Prague,  Johannesburg, London, and
elsewhere) were accompanied with protest demonstrations by broad and varied coalitions of local
and  global  social  movements,  non-governmental  organisations  (NGOs)  and  activists  of  varied
backgrounds. Due to the diversity of participants, there was also a diversity of aims and visions: a
large portion of protesters sought to reform the global system of governance and economics in more
democratic  ways,  others  wanted  to  simply rebuild  the role  of  the state  in  order  to  contain the
ongoing processes of globalisation (Green & Griffith 2002, 55), and yet others had a vision of
“radical  decentralisation  and  local  economic  integration  and  the  reconstruction  of  community”
(Atkinson & Viloria 2013, 586). This latter aspect certainly resonates with the Transition approach
and links it with this particular strand of the anti-globalisation movement. Furthermore, the sheer
scale of protest, its diversity of participants and organisations, and its unconventional characteristics
soon inspired a stream of commentaries (see e.g. Gill 2000) that saw the movement as a counter-
hegemonic force that could provide alternatives to the neoliberal world order. Understanding this
piece of history is, I believe, crucial for understanding many of the dominant views on the politics
of resistance. It is also important for understanding the Transition movement itself as it strikes very
much  as  a  continuation  of  the  vision  of  building  small-scale  alternatives  to  the  expansion  of
globalised capitalism.
Furthermore, history does not of course end here. Although the terrorist attacks of 9/11 diverted
attention away from questions of economic globalisation more towards questions of war and peace
(Green  &  Griffith  2002,  64),  the  global  financial  crisis  that  began  in  2008  and  the  austerity
measures intensified by the related Eurozone crisis also brought many people back to the streets. In
the West,  for example the Spanish Indignados and the Occupy movements of 2011–2012, drew
inspiration from past movements. In fact, it  seems evident that many of these movements – the
Zapatistas18, the global justice movement, the Occupy movement, even the Transition movement –
share certain characteristics which are crucial for later conceptualisations of resistance. Although
18 This is a social movement which in 1994 rebelled against the consequences of neoliberal expansion into Mexico and
subsequently created self-governing indigenous communities in Chiapas, Mexico.
17
the contexts vary considerably,  each of these movements seem to have responded, among other
things, to the real-life consequences related to economic globalisation; have engaged in a form of
rebellion rather than a revolution as the intent is not to overthrow the system or government as such,
but to create alternative forms of  empowerment; have aimed to build a more just order from the
individual  and  community  level  upward  rather  than  top  down;  have  experimented  with  self-
governance19 and participatory rather than top-down forms of organising; and have created new
subjectivities (see Stahler-Sholk 2010, 269–286 for a discussion on the Zapatistas).    
An essential  method of  political  resistance then becomes that of transforming  popular common
sense,  understood  as  “[t]he  beliefs  which  animate  social  action”  (Rupert  2009,  183),  or  “an
amalgam of historically effective ideologies, scientific doctrines and social mythologies” (Rupert
2003, 185). The fact that the Transition approach emphasises telling new stories as a method of
change  indicates  a  clear  connection  between  these  two.  The  actual  content  of  the  'Transition
common sense' will be elaborated on in the analysis in chapters four and five.
2.3.3. Poststructuralist perspective: The ambiguities of resistance 
Points of resistance are present everywhere in the power network. Hence there is no single
locus  of  great  Refusal,  no  soul  of  revolt,  source  of  all  rebellions,  or  pure  law  of  the
revolutionary.  Instead there is a plurality of resistances, each of them a special  case […].
(Foucault 1976, 96.)
The poststructuralist current of thought on the politics of resistance is particularly well represented
by Amoore (2006), who emphasises the  contradictions and contingencies inherent within acts of
resistance or dissent.  She draws attention to the way in which resistance in usually understood
through highly unhelpful dichotomies, such as power / resistance, or refusal / complicity. These are
based on the problematic notion that agents are representatives of either power  or resistance and
they either  refuse  or comply with powers that  are  considered external  to  them. However,  such
framing ignores the contradictory subject positions (e.g. protesting the very same things that one
supports  through  consumer  habits)  that  could  otherwise  become  politicised  and  reveal  the
complicity of our actions in the very things that we 'resist'. Similarly, proclaiming a great refusal
contains an assumption that it is possible to step outside of relations of power and thus denies the
19 The Zapatistas in particular created self-governed, autonomous communities that provided their members all of the
social programs and services that are traditionally provided by the state (education, health, a system of justice).
While  still  occupying,  many of  the  more  permanent  local  Occupy movements  also  aimed  to  provide  various
services, such as teaching, health care, food, legal aid, and so on.
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points  of  power and privilege within resistance itself.  Thirdly,  the categories of  the powerful  /
powerless  or  the  perpetrator  /  resistors  ignore  the  multiple  points  of  identity and identification
which can never provide a single, stable source of unity. Finally, rather than proclaiming a loud and
obvious Refusal, ”it is often the least obtrusive moment of dissent, hidden away in the seams of the
global  political  economy  […],  that  most  effectively  disrupt  our  sense  of  normalization  […]
(Amoore 2006, 260). 
It  is  evident  that  politics,  power  and  resistance  are  understood  here  in  a  much  broader  sense
compared to more Marxist analyses. Politics is inherently a question of power, but power itself is
both external and internal, it is a network of power relations with multiple points of resistance (and
complicity) rather than an unambiguous division between us and them. As such, the possibilities of
resistance appear to cut through all of the seven categories provided by Hollander and Einwohner.
However, even here power appears to be viewed as something inherently negative and oppressive
that calls for resistance and dissent, however incomplete and contradictory any such resistance may
be. Even so, this perspective is an invaluable tool for a more critical analysis  of the Transition
approach.   
2.3.4. Feminist perspectives: Principled pragmatism and place-based globalism
When it  comes to feminist  interventions into the politics of resistance,  the work of Eschle and
Maiguashca  (2005a;  2005b;  2007;  also  Eschle  2005)  stand  out.  Their  investigations  into  the
feminist strands of the global justice movement (which they call the 'anti-globalisation movement')
and  the  subsequent  efforts  to  develop  the  theoretical  outlines  of  the  politics  of  resistance  are
particularly enlightening and useful. While most IR theories, critical theories included, tend to avoid
addressing  the  range  of  emotional,  psychological,  and  other  forces  affecting  the  political
consciousness of activists, feminists such as Eschle and Maiguashca (2007) have no qualms about
entering this realm. Indeed, they argue for the need to beyond mapping the broad aspects of global
power  and  also  explore  the  ways  in  which  civil  society  actors  themselves conceptualise  the
problems that motivate their actions. Furthermore, their research also provides a number of other
crucial insights into the politics of resistance. 
Firstly, their work draws attention to the way in which resistance can take place in a variety of ways
and locations. For example, they show how the practices of 'anti-globalisation' activists vary from
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the instrumental and institutional to the expressive and self-developmental; how the audiences they
appeal to range from the public to the private; and how a wide variety of methods are being utilised.
Secondly,  this  research highlights  how ideational (discursive,  ideological,  cultural)  and material
(political economy, social) goals are mutually constitutive in the way that many activists seek both
kinds  of  changes  simultaneously.  Thirdly,  attention  is  drawn  to  the  way  in  which  many
understandings of the politics of resistance fail to take into consideration the power relations (such
as gender)  within movement politics  and  in the wider culture – issues which can be seen as the
product  of  both intended and unintended actions  and not  the work of a  single,  clearly defined
opponent.  Finally,  this  work  also  highlights  how  contemporary  movements  are  often  highly
pragmatic – Eschle and Maiguashga use the term principled pragmatism – in the sense that they are
experimental, flexible, and thus responding in different ways in different contexts rather than being
dictated by a particular ideology. (Eschle & Maiguashca 2007, 294–297.)
Another useful way into a feminist-influenced conceptualisation of a politics of resistance (although
the  term itself  is  not  used  here  explicitly)  comes  from outside  of  IR  in  the  work  of  feminist
economic geographers Julie Graham and Katherine Gibson (Gibson-Graham 2008). They argue that
a new revolutionary imaginary of place-based globalism – economic and social transformation that
is place-based20 yet global – has confounded the ”time-worn oppositions between global and local,
revolution  and  reform,  opposition  and  experiment,  institutional  and  individual  transformation”
(Gibson-Graham  2008,  659)  because  they  these  elements  are  inevitably  intertwined.  The  key
elements of place-based globalism, they suggest, are 
• centrality of subjects and ethical practices of self-cultivation;
• role  of  place  as  a  site  of  becoming  and  as  the  ground  of  a  global  politics  of  local
transformations;
• uneven  spatiality  and  negotiability  of  power  which  is  always  available  to  be  skirted,
marshaled, or redirected through ethical practices of freedom […];
• everyday temporality of change and the vision of transformation as a continual struggle to
change subjects and places and conditions of life under inherited circumstances of difficulty
and uncertainty. (Gibson-Graham 2008, 660.) 
The key to this imaginary is that rather than waiting for a revolution that will create a different kind
of global economy and a system of global governance, energies are focused on transforming local
economies in the present and in the everyday, in the face of globalisation (Gibson-Graham 2008,
662). In this context, local economies engaged in a range of 'postcapitalist' practices are understood
as places with different economic identities and capacities also beyond the global capitalist system.
20 'Place' in this conceptualisation can refer to any number of things, such as communities, households, workplaces, 
civic organisations, and so forth.
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More philosophically, 
place is that which is not fully yoked into a system of meaning, not entirely subsumed to a
(global) order; it is that aspect of every site that exists as potentiality. Place is the ”event in
space,” operating as a ”dislocation” with respect to familiar structures and narratives. It is the
unmapped and unmoored that allows for new moorings and mappings. Place, like the subject,
is the site and spur of becoming, the opening for politics. (Gibson-Graham 2008, 662.)
The activities and successes of social movements have demonstrated that ”small-scale changes can
be transformative and that place-based politics can be a revolutionary force when replicated across a
global  terrain”  (Gibson-Graham  2008,  662).  Therefore  meaningful  change  does  not  require
replacing a global power structure at the same hierarchical, global, organised level. Rather, change –
and by extension, resistance – is located in the ”continual struggle to transform subjects and places
and conditions of life under circumstances of difficulty and uncertainty” (Gibson-Graham 2008,
662). Politics, in this vision, relates to an ethical practice of becoming, involving articulation and
subjectivation. Similarly, 'place-based globalism' then becomes an alternative logic of politics, one
that focuses on the possibilities of the present rather than the goals of the future. (Gibson-Graham
2008, 663.) Power, in this vision, is essentially a positive force to be harnessed, not only something
to be resisted. 
2.3.5. Prefigurative perspectives: Positive direct action as a method of resistance  
Finally, this last section introduces the idea of 'prefigurative politics' into the constellation of the
politics of resistance. This concept owes its roots to anarchist thought and practice. For anarchists, it
means, first and foremost, that “there should be an ethically consistent relationship between the
means and ends”  (Milstein 2010, 68). Within contemporary activism (whether considered explicitly
anarchist  or  not),  this  has  generally referred to  two interrelated  dimensions:  organisational  and
tactical.  As  explained  by  Graeber  (2009,  11),  prefigurative  politics  refers  to  “the  mode  of
organisation and tactics undertaken which reflects the future society being sought by the group”.
Theoretically,  such a definition leaves open the actual  content of the organisational and tactical
methods, thus allowing a variety of options. This potential for openness seems to be evident also in
other definitions, such as this:
movements with a prefigurative strategy for social change […] [are] those attempting to create
social change by structuring their own practice according to the principles they want to see
govern the whole society (Leach 2013, 182).
Similarly, suggestions that prefigurative movements follow the Gandhian idea to 'be the change you
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wish to see in the world' (see e.g. Howard & Pratt-Boyden 2013, 234), or are “seeking to realize in
the here and now the transformations we envision for the future” (Brissette 2013, 223), also seems
to leave open the content of such transformations. However, in practice, these contents have also
usually been defined. Indeed, in most cases, prefigurative movements are characterised as having
horizontal and decentralised (as opposed to hierarchical and centralised) organisational structures
based on the values of “democratic participation and power-free social engagement”21 (Howard &
Pratt-Boyden 2013, 233). However, this thesis employs an open-ended, Gandhian perspective on
prefiguration and asks, rather than assumes, what is the content of the change that the Transition
movements embodies.   
In terms of tactics, prefigurative movements are characterised by direct action methods. According
to Milstein (2010, 70), direct action can be divided into two different forms: Its 'positive' form is
proactive,  based on the 'power to create',  and focuses on doing and creating in the present the
desired structures and processes of the future. The 'negative' form on the other hand is reactive,
based on the 'power to resist', and focuses on using direct means to try and block something from
happening or continuing. However,  I would argue that this division does not always hold as the
positive, proactive form of direct action can simultaneously be a way to resist, and thus also a form
of 'negative'  direct action. This is also reflected in the way in which organisational and tactical
questions  intertwine:  in  many  cases  the  organisational  experimentations  become  the  tactic  for
change  by  demonstrating  alternatives  (see  e.g.  Maeckelbergh  2011).  Either  way,  what  the
prefigurative, direct action perspective can contribute to the theoretical contours of the politics of
resistance is this realisation, echoed in feminist critical theory, that positive forms of direct action
can be also be a method of resistance and that the core issues of politics and power can actually be
those relating to social actors and their concrete practices of radical reconstruction.   
  
3. METHODOLOGICAL CONSIDERATIONS AND RESEARCH 
MATERIAL 
This chapter presents the methodological choices and the research material used in this thesis. The
methodological  aspects  complement  the  ontological,  epistemological,  normative,  and  political
21 Whether such a thing as 'power-free social engagement' actually exists is highly debatable. This most likely refers to
the conscious removal of official hierarchies, but this does not, of course, prevent the rise of unofficial hierarchies. 
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commitments reflective of critical theories and together construct what can only be termed as a
critical-hermeneutic and narrative approach to the research. The first part of the chapter introduces
the philosophical and political aspects of my methodology, reflected most of all in the narrative
research orientation.  The second part  presents a more detailed description of the analytical and
structural methods used in this thesis, which draw heavily on the 'hermeneutic triad' of explication,
(varieties  of)  explanation,  and exploration,  complemented  by a  number  of  other  analytical  and
categorisation methods.  Finally,  the last  section presents  the research material  and explains  the
rationale for choosing each of the various materials.      
3.1. A narrative research orientation as a politics of resistance of my own
Before delving into the more practical aspects relating to research methods, I will present a brief
discussion  on the  more  philosophical  and political  aspects  of  methodology.  This  relates  to  the
constant efforts of setting the 'boundaries of IR' which have been a continual source of puzzlement
and frustration for me. Indeed, during my time at Tampere University, several teachers and students
have repeatedly tried to set some kind of concrete limits on what IR is about (i.e. relating to nation-
states or questions of power). Similarly, there has been a noticeable pressure felt by students that
they must somehow prove that their work is, in fact, a work of IR. In a similar vein, my own choice
of empirical focus – what is at its base essentially an environmental social movement, but strives
and has grown to be much more – has been interrogated as not being entirely suitable for IR, even
though the combination of past  research and introductory IR textbooks seem to be much more
forgiving.  For  example,  in  Burchill  and  Linklater's  (2005)  list  of  some  recent  'disciplinary
preoccupations' in IR, one can find social movements as one the “dominant actors” (op. cit. 12);
“duties to nature, to future generations and to non-human species” (op. cit. 13) as some of the main
ethical issues; and interestingly, “[b]uilding links with social theory, historical sociology and 'world
history',  and dismantling  barriers  between International  Relations,  Political  Theory and Ethics”
(ibid.) as some of the main prospects for  multidisciplinarity (which is thus treated in the positive
rather than in the negative). The varied nature of IR also becomes evident in Brown and Ainley's
(2005) effort at defining IR:
On the basis that there must be some kind of limiting principle if we are to study anything at all, we
might agree that International Relations is the study of cross-border transactions in general, and thus
leave  open  the  nature  of  these  transactions,  but  even  this  will  not   do,  since  it  presumes  the
importance of political boundaries […] (Brown & Ainley 2005, 7)   
Indeed, if IR textbooks are this open about the content of IR, the question then becomes, why the
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need to constantly question what is and is not a 'proper' object of research for a student of IR? The
easy answer – and I do not have a better one – is that this is a question of power and domination. It
is a form of micropolitics of the classroom, the university, and the practitioners of IR that tries to set
the limits of the possible. As such, it invites resistance, indeed demands resistance. As my choice of
topic is not that controversial, it is my narrative research orientation that tries to somehow strive for
self-liberation. It represents a politics of resistance to what Penttinen (2004, 41) refers to as the
“hierarchic inherently masculinist logico-scientific form” of traditional academic writing. Although
such a form is also present in much of this thesis, it is contrasted and accompanied with personal
self-reflections that also take centre stage during the course of this thesis. Another reason for this
experiment rises from the obvious potential contradiction between criticising scientific rationality
(in theory and in the context of the Transition movement) and at the same time privileging the very
same form of thinking through my own writing.  By experimenting and using diverse forms of
analysis and expression, I take part in a prefigurative politics of resistance.         
To be clear, when I speak of a narrative research orientation, I am referring, first and foremost, to a
narrative  form  of  knowledge  that  mixes  the  subjective  and  the  objective,  focuses  on  human
intentions and actions, and looks at the particular circumstances of time and space, rather than the
universal, ahistorical categories logico-scientific knowledge (Czarniawska 2004b, 651). As Bochner
(2001) so eloquently puts it, a narrative orientation  
moves away from a singular monolithic conception of social science towards pluralism that promotes
multiple forms of representation and research; away from facts and towards meanings; away from
master narratives and toward local stories; away from idolizing categorical thought and abstracted
theory toward embracing the values of irony, emotionality, and activism; away from assuming the
stance  of  disinterested  spectator  and  toward  assuming  the  posture  of  feeling,  embodied  and
vulnerable observer; away from writing essays and toward telling stories. (Bochner 2001, 135.)
Such an orientation is extremely challenging as it goes against what the student in me considers
common sense,  and thus my efforts do not (yet)  do justice to the Bochner's  poetic description.
Nonetheless, I consider it important to try and believe that the journey is worth taking. 
 
3.2. The hermeneutic triad as research method: Explication, explanation, and 
exploration
In terms of the practical framework in conducting the analysis, this thesis utilises the 'hermeneutic
triad' of Paul Hernadi (1987) as interpreted by Barbara Czarniawska (2004a; 2004b). It supports and
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complements the above-mentioned narrative research orientation seamlessly, while also allowing
for  critical  analysis  and  reflection.  The  hermeneutic  triad  consists  of  three  layers  of  analysis:
explication,  explanation  and  exploration.  Explication  is  essentially  a  summary  of  the  text  or
narrative in question and can also be characterised as reconstruction, reproductive translation, or
'standing under' the text. Explanation, on the other hand, is preoccupied with interpreting, often in a
critical  vein,  why or  how the text  says  what  it  does.  As such,  it  can be viewed as  a  form of
deconstruction, inferential detection, or 'standing over' the text. Finally, exploration refers to a more
creative form of analysis where the reader brings her own life and experience into the narrative,
something which is often considered inappropriate for scientific texts, but which is often utilised,
for example, by feminist scholars. In contrast to the first two, exploration can be characterised as a
form of construction, existential enactment, or 'standing in' for the author.  (Czarniawska 2004a, 60–
61.) 
In  practice,  all  three  methods  of  analysis  are  usually  present  simultaneously  (and  often
unconsciously) and contain a number challenges. Explication, or a summary that is supposed to be
free  of  interpretation,  is  inevitably an interpretation  of  what  is  central  to  the overall  narrative.
Similarly, explanation comes with its own challenges, such as choosing between particular modes
of explanation: subjectivist explanation, objectivist explanation, or constructivist explanation. While
subjectivist explanations generally focus on the perceived intentions of the author(s),  objectivist
explanations often emphasise 'external structures',  such as class, power relationships, gender, or
specific historical circumstances. Objectivist explanations generally represent a form of 'dialectical
criticism', the dialectics of appearance and essence. Constructivist explanations, on the other hand,
are based on the view that the meaning of the text is constructed anew in interaction, thus gaining
different  meanings  in  different  contexts.  The  process  itself  becomes  more  important  than  the
original product. Finally, exploration, the third element of the hermeneutic triad, can be challenging
due  to  its  creativity,  the  task  of  revealing  and  constructing  one's  identity  through  the  work.
(Czarniawska 2004a, 61–72.) 
The  impossibility  of  somehow  stepping  outside  of  interpretation  and  personal  knowledge  and
experience base has encouraged me to combine and 'reshuffle' these elements in the following way.
The first part of the analysis, chapter four, will first use the combination of explication (what) and
subjective explanation (how / why) in order to understand the various problems, methods, and goals
embodied in the Transition model. These are crucial for the subsequent analysis of the Transition
politics  of resistance.  This part  of the analysis  resembles,  and is  indeed informed by,  forms of
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narrative analysis,  frame analysis,  and the organisation of the data into thematic or  substantive
categories.  Narrative  analysis  is  reflected  in  the  way  that  the  overall  Transition  approach  is
presented in narrative form (i.e. that first there is a particular state of affairs, then the Transition
movement comes along, and the end result is an improved state of affairs). This choice is based on
two things: the Transition approach appears to be presented as a narrative in the research material
and the members of Transition Network place a significant emphasis on creating “new stories and
myths” as a method of change (see e.g. Principles 2014; Hopkins 2011, 77). 
The use of frame analysis, on the other hand, refers here to a form of qualitative text analysis that
follows fairly directly from the theory of framing by David Snow and Robert Benford (1988; see
also  Benford  &  Snow  2000;  Snow  &  Byrd  2007).  According  to  Snow  and  Benford,  social
movements  construct collective  action  frames,  understood  as  persuasively  articulated  action-
oriented sets of shared beliefs and meanings that aim to motivate and legitimate action (Benford &
Snow 2000, 614). These can also be viewed as movement-specific ideologies that are dynamic and
link together slices of history, religious or ideological beliefs, ideas of justice and particular events
(Snow & Byrd 2007, 130–131).  The success  of social  movements’ framing activities generally
requires the fulfilment of three  core framing tasks which include  diagnostic framing,  prognostic
framing, and motivational framing. Diagnostic framing refers to the identification of some aspect of
life as an unbearable problem and the assignment of blame or causality. Prognostic framing, on the
other hand, refers to the articulation of solutions and the methods or strategies through which to
achieve them. Finally, motivational framing – which is not however considered explicitly in this
thesis – signifies the calls to action that are meant to motivate people to move ‘from the balcony to
the barricades’. (Snow & Benford 1988, 200–202; Benford & Snow 2000, 616–617; Snow & Byrd
2007, 126–128.) The explication and subjective explanation of the Transition approach follows the
logic of frame analysis in that it first examines the 'diagnosis' of problems and then the 'prognosis'
of  strategies  and  solutions.  These  are  placed,  and  indeed  complement,  the  overall  narrative
framework. 
Finally,  the organisation of the data into particular headings and subheadings in chapter four is
based  on  the   above-mentioned  use  of  thematic,  substantive  categories.  This  means  that  the
categories  “are  mainly  descriptive,  in  a  broad  sense  that  includes  description  of  participants'
concepts and beliefs; they stay close to the data categorised, and don't inherently imply a more
abstract  theory”  (Maxwell  2012,  112).  All  of  these  elements  form  the  basis  of  subsequent
conceptualisations of the Transition form of politics of resistance.
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After  this  initial  empirical  analysis,  chapter  five  enters  the  realm  of  'objectivist  explanation'
(Czarniawska  2004a,  65–67)  where  the  analysis  is  translated  into  more  'theoretical  categories'
(Maxwell 2012, 113). This means that the Transition approach established in chapter four is now
placed in a more explicitly theoretical context, meaning that it is interpreted through the theoretical
framework of this thesis, using categories that reflect the relevant theoretical concepts (thus making
an interpretation of the initial interpretation). Finally, chapter six is an attempt to step outside of the
dominant  logico-scientific  form  of  knowledge  and  writing  and  into  the  realm  of  personal
exploration and reflection by presenting a personal narrative. This section also functions as a critical
self-reflection of the research process and my role in it.  Table 1 recounts the key methods and
research questions relating to these three core chapters.  
Table 1: Outline of methods, research questions and key findings and insights of chapters four, five and six.
To be clear, the terms 'explaining' and 'understanding' are not to be equated with the traditional
understanding of these terms within IR methodology and the classic third / fourth debate within our
discipline22. Popularised most notably by Hollis and Smith (1990), explaining in IR terminology of
methology has generally been associated with positivist, empiricist, and rationalist  approaches that
consciously  imitate  the  natural  sciences  in  an  effort  to  discover  general  causes.  In  contrast,
understanding has been associated with interpretive, hermeneutic approaches that seek to reveal the
22 In the classic narrative of the 'great debates' taught to IR undergraduates across the world, the first debate took place
from the interwar to early postwar years between idealists and realists over the role of international institutions and
the possibility of preventing wars; the second debate from the 1960s onwards between the traditionalists (humanists)
and the modernisers (behaviouralists) over methodology; the third debate (although not all accounts include this
one) in 1970s and 1980s between realist,  pluralist,  and Marxist  persepectives over the processes and nature of
international politics; and finally, since the 1980s, between the so called rationalists and reflectivists over meta-
theoretical questions. (See e.g. Kurki & Wight 2013, 16–24.) 
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Chapter 4 Chapter 5 Chapter 6
Explication (what),
Key methods
Theoretical categories Personal narrative
Exploration (researcher's identity and 
experience),
Subjectivist Explanation 
(how / why)
Objectivist Explanation 
(how)
Constructivist Explanation (interaction 
between researcher and text; research 
process)
Narrative analysis, 
frame analysis. 
Substantive categories
Research 
questions
What are the core criticisms, 
strategies and solutions embodied in 
the Transition narrative?
How is the Transition movement a 
form of politics of resistance and how 
can this case study help to advance 
IR's understanding of social 
movements and the politics of 
resistance?
How does my own identity and 
positionality interact with the 
research?
intersubjective meanings, reasons and beliefs of particular actors and behaviours. (See e.g. Wendt
1998, 101–102; Adler 2002, 105; Suganami 2008, 344; Kurki & Wight 2013, 20.) If this conceptual
dichotomy between explaining and understanding is accepted, the ontological, epistemological and
methodological perspectives of this thesis clearly situate this work in the reflectivist, hermeneutic
camp of understanding.23 However, it seems that the main function of sustaining this dichotomy has
been to  legitimise the  former as  'proper  science'  and delegitimise and marginalise  the  latter  as
essentially 'non-science' (Wendt 1998, 102). The result has arguably been “the impoverishment of
our collective efforts” to make sense of the world (ibid.). 
Therefore, it has been a conscious decision of mine to use both terms intermittently (demonstrated
for example by the title of chapter four: Explication and subjective explanation: Understanding the
Transition narrative). After all, “[t]he standard dictionary meaning of the verb, 'to explain', is 'to
make  plain'  or  'to  render  more  intelligible'”,  thus  making  something  more  understandable
(Suganami  2008,  329–330).  In  this  view,  the  two  terms  are  intertwined:  understanding  is  a
prerequisite for explaining something. This is the logic that informs the structure and terminology
of this thesis (besides the fact that 'explanation' is the original term used in the hermeneutic triad – a
contradiction in terms if the IR dichotomy of explaining and understanding is accepted). Similarly,
the  terms  subjectivist,  objectivist  and  constructivist  explanation  do  not  refer  so  much  to  the
properties of the researcher – i.e. being subjective or objective in the analysis – but rather to the
focus of the analysis. Subjectivist explanation focuses on the authors and the material, objectivist
explanation to the structures and theories, and constructivist to the research process itself. Together
these constitute a sympathetic, yet critical and self-reflective work that aims to neither idealise nor
undermine its subject matter. 
3.3. Primary research material: The publications of the Transition Network
The primary research material used in this thesis consist of a number of documents and publications
produced by the members of the Transition Network. The most prominent of these are the fairly
information-intensive Transition Network website (home page:  http://www.transitionnetwork.org/)
and the related REconomy website (http://www.reconomy.org/), the 50-page document  Transition
Initiatives  Primer (Brangwyn  & Hopkins  2008),  and  the  key books  The  Transition  Handbook
23 The valorisation of scientific rationality inherent in the positivist, empiricist methodologies of 'explaining', including
the use of reductionist methodologies that ignore complex interactions between things (Paterson 2001, 50–51) goes
against the very fibre of this thesis.
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(Hopkins 2008) and the The Transition Companion (Hopkins 2011). 
The websites and the Primer are important, because they are, in effect, the heart of the movement
network; the Transition Network website is the place where the various local movements register
themselves as part of the wider Transition movement; where they are provided with information,
assistance, support and a forum for the exchange of ideas. This is also the site of several personal
blogs, which are also referred to in instances where they have been particularly enlightening. The
REconomy website is important, because it is a more direct source to the economic problems and
solutions advocated by the Transition approach. A 'careful read' of the Primer, on the other hand, is
the first requirement for any group that wishes to call themselves a Transition x (a region / town /
village / suburb / neighbourhood), thus making it a key document for the movement. Similarly, the
two books – the content of which is also present throughout the Transition Network website – can
also be viewed as key materials that explain the Transition approach to both prospective participants
and wider audiences. Even though they have been written from the particular experience base of the
movement founder and the Transition Network, they are nonetheless invaluable for determining the
core uniting principles – the problems, strategies and solutions (the key issues relating to the politics
of resistance) – of the broader Transition approach. 
4. EXPLICATION AND SUBJECTIVE EXPLANATION: 
UNDERSTANDING THE TRANSITION NARRATIVE  
This chapter constitutes the empirical, qualitative analysis of the Transition narrative, utilising the
methodological  tools  presented  in  the  previous  chapter.  It  is  already  clear  that  the  Transition
movement's grand narrative, its rationale for action, is one where multiple crises are viewed and
represented as opportunities to create something positive, “something extraordinary” out of a bad
situation  (What  2014)24.  The  longer  explanation  of  this  view  is  that  there  are  recognisable,
indisputable, and urgent – environmental, energy and economic – problems that have to be solved.
Governments are viewed as  not doing enough and individual actions as  not being enough, so the
solution is that communities, with the local Transition movements as leaders and facilitators, take
matters in their own hands and begin the 'descent' to localisation and greater 'resilience' (What is a
24 See also Hopkins (2011, 74):  “In Transition, we take the issues  that  feel  poisonous, which are distressing and
potentially catastrophic – peak oil, climate change, economic contraction – but we view them as possibilities, as
opportunities.”
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Transition Initiative? 2014). A core element of this narrative is that this is not a path of doom and
gloom, but one of positive participation and experimentation. However, the details of what all of
this – peak oil, climate change, economic issues, transition, localisation, resilience – is perceived to
mean  is far from straightforward. Thus, the purpose of this chapter is to take a closer look at the
narrative  and its  implications;  the  content  and the  meanings  that  the  authors  of  the  Transition
Network attribute to each of the problems (the original state of affairs) and their solutions (the
change to another state of affairs). In other words, this chapter lays out the basic outlines of what it
is  that  the  movement  resists  or  challenges  (the  problems)  and the  core  methods  and solutions
embodied in the Transition narrative. A more thorough analysis of their 'politics of resistance' will
follow in the subsequent chapter. 
4.1. In the beginning...
4.1.1. The explicit: The “twin issues” of peak oil and climate change 
The Transition Initiatives Primer (Brangwyn & Hopkins 2008) is perhaps the most useful starting
point due to its continuing role as 'required reading' for any group that wishes to become an 'official'
Transition  Initiative  (see  Becoming  official  2014).  Although  somewhat  outdated,  having  been
finalised in 2008, it can nonetheless be be viewed as a key document for the entire movement. The
introduction (Brangwyn & Hopkins 2008, 3) describes how the “twin pressures of Peak Oil and
Climate Change” have inspired several communities in the UK, Ireland and elsewhere to take “an
integrated  and inclusive  approach to  reduce  their  carbon  footprint  and increase  their  ability  to
withstand  the fundamental shift that will accompany Peak Oil”. What this also translates to is a
transition to “a lower energy future [to combat climate change] and to greater levels of community
resilience [to combat peak oil]” (ibid.). These are essentially the 'hard core' of the movement, the
first part of the movement slogan which also includes the solutions of resilience and relocalisation.  
In the next section of the Primer,  the authors  take the task of explaining in further  detail  why
Transition initiatives are necessary. They emphasise the importance of climate change and peak oil
as “[t]he two toughest challenges facing humankind at the start of this 21st century” (Brangwyn &
Hopkins 2008, 3). Due to the authors' view of climate change as a well-known phenomenon, the
section concentrates on the concept of peak oil which is described as “heralding the era of ever-
declining fossil fuel availability [which] may well challenge the economic and social stability that is
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essential  if  we  are  to  mitigate  the  threats  posed  by  Climate  Change”  (ibid.).  The  Transition
initiatives are presented as “the most promising way of engaging people and communities to take
the far-reaching actions that are required to mitigate the effects of Peak oil and Climate Change”
(op. cit., 4, emphasis added). 
The following section goes deeper into the question of peak oil and recounts how, from the 1900s
onwards, plentiful oil has enabled 'a coal-based industrialised society'  to hugely intensify its so
called  development  (the authors  themselves  explicitly question the  idea  of  development  in  this
context).  It  is  described  how  year  after  year,  with  more  and  more  oil  available,  society  has
“increased  its  complexity,  its  mechanisation,  its  globalised  interconnectedness  and  its  energy
consumption levels” (Brangwyn & Hopkins 2008, 4). Peak oil creates a problem for the survival of
this way of life, because it refers to
the end of cheap and plentiful  oil,  the recognition that the ever increasing volumes of oil  being
pumped into our economies will peak and then inexorably decline. It's about understanding how our
industrial way of life is absolutely dependent on this ever-increasing supply of cheap oil. (Ibid.)    
The authors go to great lengths to repeatedly emphasise that peak oil is not about running out of oil
per se, but about being “close to running out of easy-to-get, cheap oil” which means that there will
be an “energy decline – that extended period when, year on year, we have decreasing amounts of oil
to fuel our industrialised way of life” (Brangwyn & Hopkins 2008, 5, emphasis in the original). The
theory  of  peak  oil  and  all  its  associated  consequences,  which  are  essentially  presented  as
indisputable facts, are based on past observations of oil field depletion patterns and contemporary
research by “a growing body of independent oil experts and oil geologists [who] have calculated
that the peak will occur between 2006 and 2012” (ibid.). In essence, the effects of peak oil are
portrayed as nothing short  of disastrous25,  but no concrete examples are discussed.  The overall
message is nonetheless emphasised by several references to various experts, such as a number of oil
authors, former oil company representatives, and politicians26, who all seem to confirm the peak oil
predictions and their severity in some way or another. (Op. cit., 5–6.)   
As the 'disastrous effects' of peak oil are not made explicit in the Transition Initiatives Primer, it
seems necessary to examine other key material. A look at the Transition Network website reveals
that neither climate change or peak oil are elaborated on in very much detail. Climate change is
25 Some examples  include:  “Peak  Oil  [...]  may well  challenge  [...]  economic  and  social  stability”  (Brangwyn  &
Hopkins 2008, 3); “The problems start when we’ve extracted around half of the recoverable oil. [...] At this point, oil
supply plateaus and then declines, with massive ramifications for industrialised societies.” (Op. cit., 4.) “It's difficult
to overstate what this means to our lives in the developed countries” (op. cit. 5).
26 The relationship to politics is an intriguing aspect that will be discussed further in section 4.1.5. 
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treated  as  a  rather  common sense,  self-evident  phenomenon,  and is  introduced  through  highly
detailed, scientific figures27. Peak oil, on the other hand, is represented as heralding “the Age of
Unaffordable Energy (2008-?)” which means that “we are increasingly at risk, economically and
socially” (Why 2014). It is also associated with a problem of 'oil addiction' and, again, “a way of
life which is dependent on easy access to fossil fuels” (ibid.). The practical effects are, in other
words, again left to the imagination. However, Hopkins' (2008, 2011) books provide some insight:
When peak oil is dropped into the mix, localisation is no longer a choice – it is the inevitable
direction in which we are moving, one we can do nothing about, other than to decide whether
we want to embrace its possibilities or cling to what we perceive that we are about to lose.
[…] The principal reason for this is transportation. […] In 2004, 74% of petroleum products
were used for transportation, and figures for the following year show that nearly all (98.8%)
of energy consumed by the transport sector was petroleum. (Hopkins 2008, Chapter 4: Why
small is inevitable?, section “Relocalisation”.)
To recap, given that our current globalised/centralised supply systems are entirely dependent
on cheap liquid fossil fuels, and the uninterrupted supply of those fuels and their continuing
cheapness are increasingly in doubt,  we need to focus on the creation of local production
systems. (Hopkins 2008, Chapter 4: Why small is inevitable?, section “Relocalisation”.)
[T]he price volatility of oil will inevitably begin to reverse the assumptions that underpin the
economics of globalisation” (Hopkins 2011, 47).
In other words, the core argument seems to be that peak oil will translate to such increases and
changes in the price of oil that long-distance supply chains will become not only environmentally,
but financially, unviable. Although the economic and social risks are not spelt out, this seems to
refer, first and foremost, to situations where, for example, long supply chains are interrupted due to
'oil  shocks'  or extreme climate conditions and therefore supermarkets actually run out food and
other necessary items, thus causing widespread panic and chaos28. Another suggestion seems to be
that prices of various everyday items become so high (due to the role of oil in their production and
distribution) that large numbers of people can no longer afford to meet their basic needs. It seems
reasonable to interpret that these scenarios (which may of course take place simultaneously) are at
the base of the suggested 'unprecedented' economic, social and political threats contained in the idea
of peak oil. 
27 “We must leave 2,795 gigatons of CO2 in the ground. This is about 80% of what remains. We can release only
20.2%, or 565 gigatons, of the remaining CO2 into the atmosphere.” (Why 2014.)
28 This is supported, for example, by the following experience in the UK when, in September 2000, protesters blocked
the English Channel: 
“Enormous lines appeared at gas stations as panic buying spread across the country on day 4; 
Over half of Britain’s gas stations were closed by day 6, 90% by day 9; 
Food stores experienced the same wave of panic buying, forcing supermarkets to close or impose rationing; 
Hospitals suspended all but emergency care and began to run out of blood and essential supplies; 
Mail delivery and public transportation operated on reduced schedules; 
Heavy industries  — auto  manufacturers,  steel  plants,  aerospace  plants  and  the  like  — began planning immediate
cutbacks, layoffs and closures as they ran short of fuel, parts, raw materials and workers who could get to work.”
(Transition Voice blog entry 07.08.2013.)
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4.1.2. Underlying causes and effects: Socio-cultural considerations 
Although peak oil and climate change represent the most explicit part of the Transition rationale,
other related concerns are also clearly present. The role of socio-cultural29 and economic issues are
arguably more pronounced in the current content of the Transition Network website than in the
2008 Transition Initiatives Primer, but even in the Primer, these questions are incorporated under
the theme of 'the wider context of Transition'. The core issue here is that 
along with these community-based transitions, each individual needs to evolve away from addiction
to oil and a whole raft of ecologically devastating practices, away from the complex web that locks
them into the endless growth paradigm (Brangwyn & Hopkins 2008, 31, emphasis added).
[...]
This journey involves fully feeling the unbearable weight of accountability for what's happening, the
complicity we all have in supporting this unsustainable paradigm (ibid.).
  
This clearly seems to enter the realm of 'causes' – what are some of the core background factors that
have  brought  us  to  the  present  predicament  and  are  making  any  kind  of  meaningful  change
extremely hard. It seems reasonable to deduce that this threefold reference to 'oil addiction' (a theme
that is repeated throughout the publications of the Transition Network), 'a whole raft of ecologically
devastating practices', and 'the endless growth paradigm' clearly refer, in the context of ordinary
people, to the highly prevalent individualistic and materialistic value orientations and lifestyles that,
at  least  in  West,  most  people  have  become to  consider  as  a  normal  way of  life.  Indeed,  it  is
considered  normal  that  people  not  only own their  own sets  of  everything  (cars,  houses,  tools,
computers, appliances, and so forth), but they also own vast amounts of everything and these things
are also frequently thrown away so that new, more fashionable or 'upgraded' versions can take their
place30. This certainly creates massive problems related to, for example, carbon emissions, resource
depletion and waste disposal. Overall, this idea that the Western way of life (both cultural and social
manifestations) is, in fact, at the centre of what the Transition approach is essentially challenging is
supported  also  by other  references  and criticisms  of  “this  unviable  way of  living”  (What  is  a
Transition Initiative? 2014), “the throwaway society” (Brangwyn & Hopkins 2008, 26), and “the
atomised, disconnected unsustainable and inequitable society that we've grown into” (Brangwyn &
Hopkins 2008, 13). 
29 To be clear, cultural issues are here understood as those dealing with commonly shared mental aspects (beliefs,
meanings, and the like) whereas social issues are understood as the practical, physical manifestations of these mental
aspects as well as other, more structural features (see Maxwell 2012, 25). The term 'socio-cultural' thus incorporates
both aspects.
30 Of course, a lot of things are nowadays designed with built-in obsolescence, meaning that they invariably have a
short or limited lifespan – arguably another feature of the 'growth paradigm'.
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Furthermore, the continual references to the way in which Transition initiatives are making people
happier  as  well  as  “creating  happier,  fairer  and  stronger  communities”  (What  is  a  Transition
Initiative?  2014),  strikes  as  a  clear  indication  of  the  perception  that  the  individualistic  and
materialistic  values  and  practices  are  threatening  wellbeing  and  happiness  in  contemporary
(Western) societies. This is supported by countless other references, such as “these relocalisation
efforts are designed to result in a life that is more fulfilling, more socially connected and more
equitable” (Brangwyn & Hopkins 2008, 4); “[w]hen we use the term "Transition" we’re talking
about the changes we need to make to get to a low-carbon, socially-just,  healthier and happier
future” (Transition Network's Draft Strategy 2014). Thus, the underlying diagnosis of socio-cultural
problems seems to work on two levels (causes and consequences), both of which create their own,
interrelated sets of issues. 
In addition, before delving into the economic dimensions of the 'endless growth paradigm', another
cultural  aspect  deserves  attention  –  that  of  anthropocentrism.  Although  not  usually  expressed
explicitly31,  a criticism of anthropocentrism is clearly prevalent in the Transition narrative.  It is
evident,  for  example,  in  the  statement  that  “[t]he  challenges  we face  are  not  just  caused by a
mistake in our technologies but as a direct result of our world view and belief system” (Principles
2014; see also Hopkins 2011, 78). The fact that 'world view' is presented as a singular and is coming
from what  is,  at  its  core,  an  environmental  movement,  seems to  indicate  that  this  is  indeed a
reference to anthropocentrism, the view that humans are the most central or the most significant
entities in the world. This is also supported by the following:  
[E]ach of us needs to travel closer to a heartfelt understanding that if we want to stay living on Earth,
we'll have to weave ourselves back into the fabric of the planet, and comprehend that the “humans
are separate from the earth” duality underpinning our industrialised societies is false, misleading and
a one-way ticket to hell on earth far hotter than we can handle. (Brangwyn & Hopkins 2008, 31.
If  we  are  to  transition  to  fundamentally  different  physical  systems  for  living  we  will  need  a
fundamentally different way of understanding the world. Changing our worldview from separate to
interconnected, from scarcity thinking to enough for all, from competitive to collaborative, all form
part of the Inner Transition landscape. (About Inner Transition 2014.)
The  question of human-nature duality – the separation of humans and nature – which is arguably a
core feature of anthropocentrism and scientific rationality (for the latter, see Paterson 2001, 50–51),
thus emerges as yet another source of resistance.  
31 One exception is the Transition Initiatives Primer's section on movies that help to reconnect people to nature where
it is stated that “[t]hese movies [...] help overcome the dominant anthropocentric view of this planet” (Brangwyn &
Hopkins 2008, 40.
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4.1.3. Underlying causes and effects: (Socio-)Economic considerations 
To return to the question of an unsustainable 'growth paradigm' expressed in the previous section,
the thought also presents itself within the context of economic structures. It is repeated, among
other  things,  in  the Transition Network website where the core rationales for 'doing Transition'
beyond  climate  change  and  oil  addiction  are  a  “skewed  economy”  and  the  “Myth  of  Endless
Expansion” (Why 2014). The reason for characterising the economy as 'skewed' is based on the
considerable dominance of large chains and the minority status of 'independent businesses'. The
latter kind is considered infinitely better because they “create more jobs, better health, wellbeing
and social justice” and “keep the money we spend circulating in our local economy”32 (Why 2014).
Although these views are expressed as being based on independent research, such statements seem
at first glance somewhat controversial. Certainly there is no guarantee that independent businesses
as such are automatically the beacons of wellbeing and social justice. This aspect becomes clearer,
however,  when examining the  kind of  businesses – social,  cooperative enterprises (discussed in
further detail under the section on solutions) – the Transition Network actually promotes (see e.g.
The New Economy in 20 Enterprises 2013). The 'myth of endless expansion', on the other hand,
refers to “a flawed financial  system” that  only focuses on monetary growth rather  than,  again,
“community,  wellbeing,  social  justice  and  resilience  (the  ability  to  respond  and  adapt  to  the
unexpected)” (Why 2014).   
Certainly  it  is  clear  from  these  statements  that  the  current  economic  and  financial  system  is
considered to be a core problem that is detrimental to the much repeated values of community,
wellbeing,  social  justice,  and resilience.  It  is  also seen to relate  to the consequent  problems of
“economic inequalities” and “economic hardship” (What is a Transition Initiative? 2014), as well as
“economic  fragility”  (Policies  for  Transition  2014). However,  much  of  the  Transition  Network
website  and the  related publications  seem to avoid  any thorough analyses  of  problems (for  an
exception, see e.g. Miller & Hopkins 2013). This seems to be a conscious part of their approach
which involves focusing on positive solutions rather than the underlying problems: 
Transition initiatives are based on creating clear and practical visions of a community to help it
reduce or lose its dependence on fossil  fuels.  The primary focus is on practical possibilities and
opportunities  rather  than on campaigning against  current  problems.  (Hopkins  2011,  77;  see also
Principles 2014.)
32 This same sentiment that money spent in local enterprises tends to be re-spent in the local economy (in wages, local
suppliers, accounting, distribution, cleaning, marketing, insurance, and so forth) while money spent in large chains
tends to end up, with the exception of wages, in distant locations, is repeated in various places and documents, such
as  “The New Economy in 20 Enterprises” (2013). 
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Nevertheless,  the  Transition  Network's  'REconomy project'  shines  more  light  on  the  economic
dimension. This is one of the few places where things are laid out in more direct language (instead
of the common use of euphemisms). Indeed, in their section on “Understanding economics & new
economics”  (2014),  they  first  define  the  meaning  of  an  economic  system  as  “the  system  of
producing and distributing  of  goods  and services  and allocating  resources  in  a  society”  which
includes a great number of actors, including consumers. They then go on to describe the present
situation as follows:
[T]oday the  dominant  form of  economic  organization  at  the  global  level  is  based  on  capitalist
market-oriented mixed economies. This is characterised by promotion of high consumption rates,
aided by short product lifetimes, built-in obsolescence (so you need to buy new versions/models),
fast-changing fashions  and throw-away culture.  It  assumes  the  earth  has  unlimited  resources  as
inputs,  and  an  unlimited  ‘sink’ for  receiving  waste  outputs.  (Understanding  economics  &  new
economics 2014.) 
The problems inherent in this form are expressed to relate particularly (but not exclusively) to the
paradox of the economy, energy and the environment – namely, that the capitalist, market-oriented
economic systems, which are based on infinite economic growth, depend on ever greater amounts
of finite natural  resources.  In other  words,  the 'healthier'  the economy is  (meaning the more it
grows), the unhealthier are its sources of growth. Other problematic features mentioned are the
ever-increasing amounts of debt and inequality, as well as the use of gross domestic product (GDP)
as the measurement of growth and wellbeing. (Understanding economics & new economics 2014;
see also related links on this  website.)  In a similar fashion, the Post Carbon Institute's  and the
Transition Networks co-produced report by Miller and Hopkins (2013) characterises the present
system as “the sinking ship of globalized, fossil-fuelled, inequitable, growth-based economy”. It is
certainly clear that the global form of economic organization is at the core of what the Transition
ideology resists  and it  does  so  on  the  back  of  the  perceived ecological,  social,  and  economic
consequences. 
To clarify further, the perceived socio-economic consequences of such an economic system seem to
revolve around the questions of economic inequalities and economic hardship or instability. The
frequent references to debt, inequality and providing jobs and livelihoods (see e.g. Social enterprise
and entrepreneurship 2014) certainly resonate with the increasingly precarious nature of financial
stability in a highly globalised and mechanised world. For the Transition key figure, the effects of
such a world are nothing short of a crisis of civilisation: 
Imagine the day when you can do all your week's shopping without ever speaking to anyone.
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Something  is  lost,  something  as  fundamental  to  our  wellbeing  as  being  able  to  hear  the
birdsong on a Spring morning. As hearing the sound of children playing. Civility, community,
humanity, all start to unravel. (Hopkins blog entry 10.04.2014.)
 
4.1.4. Economic growth in further detail  
Since the issue of growth in particular – understood as the aforementioned “monetary growth within
a flawed financial system” (Why 2014) – is such a central feature of the Transition approach, I
decided that it needs to be explored in further detail as an issue of its own. It is clearly considered to
'imperil' core Transition values, such as “community, wellbeing, social justice and resilience” (Why
2014), but it is hardly elaborated on in much details. A key question that should perhaps be attended
to is why is growth such a crucial goal of national and global policies? Although the Transition
documents say very little about this,  academics writing on the topic of  degrowth provide some
answers.  Essentially,  the political  vision of growth as  the key to  societal  and global  wellbeing
appears to  be based on a  neoclassical  economic ideology (Spangenberg 2010, 561–563) which
advocates a thoroughly materialistic understanding of human well-being33. It also assumes that even
though production in a microeconomic (individual household or company) level has a point where
further growth in production will have more costs than benefits, no such ‘optimal scale’ exists at the
macroeconomic  level  (economy as  a  whole).  As  a  consequence,  as  much economic  growth  as
possible is promoted as the standard of institutional success as well as societal progress and well-
being. (Alexander 2012, 352–353.) 
Similarly, GDP accounting – created in the aftermath of the 1930s Great Depression and World War
II and now the standard macroeconomic way of measuring growth34 – is based on the neoclassical
view  that  a  value  of  a  thing  (be  it  an  item,  such  as  a  potato,  or  a  service,  such  as  legal
representation) is contained only in its market price and therefore all non-monetary activities and
various ecological, social and political side-effects are excluded from it.  (Alexander 2012, 352–
353.) The dominance of GDP in public policy has also been strengthened, for example, by the so
called  ‘Okun’s  law’ found  in  most  macroeconomic  textbooks.  According  to  it,  the  rate  of
unemployment is directly related to the growth rate of GDP and an annual growth rate of two to
33 Within this framework, human well-being within a given society is seen as directly linked to the size of the economy
and the degree of personal choice in market transactions (Alexander 2012, 352–353).
34 In practice, GDP can be seen as “the market value of all final goods and services produced within a country during a
given period of time” (Mankiw 2008, 510, in Alexander 2012, 351) and it can be calculated, for example, by the
adding up the “total of all expenditures made in consuming the finished goods and services” (Jackson 2002, 99, in
Alexander 2012, 351).
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three percent is required in order to keep unemployment from rising. Degrowth proponents note,
however, that although this may hold true in the present system, alternative employment structures
and policies that reduce average working hours while maintaining a decent standard of living would
have the capability to maintain high levels of employment also in a degrowth system. (Eriksson and
Andersson 2010, 133.) 
In addition,  there are also other factors that are seen to contribute to the contemporary obsession
with growth and hinder any fundamental change. For example, Eriksson and Andersson (2010, 125)
argue that the modern 'growthmania' is driven by the drive for profit-centered growth (a core feature
of  capitalism),  the  competition  between  collective  actors,  especially  nation-states,  and  the
competition for status between affluent individuals. They thus locate the continuation of growth-
centred policies primarily within three realms – the capitalist economic system, the state system,
and the cultural sphere. In a somewhat similar vein, van Griethuysen (2010, 590–595) explains how
the  dominance  of  economic  growth  over  social  and  ecological  considerations  is  based  on  the
fundamental  institutions of  capitalism,  especially the principle  of private  property and property
expansion which intertwine with particular  cultural  expectations.  These views are supported by
countless others who emphasise the way in which growth is a structural feature of capitalism – a
system of “grow or die” (Kallis 2011, 875). On the other hand, Spangenberg (2010) and Alexander
(2012) also emphasise the mere strength of the growth discourse itself which has come to represent
economic growth as the key to nearly all national, regional and global problems whether economic,
political, social, or even ecological in nature. 
These arguments are more or less weaved together in Trainer's (2012) outline of some of the key
issues related to growth. The first of these is the logic of modern banking and interest payments,
which depend on economic growth; “[i]f more has to be paid back than was lent or invested, then
the total amount of capital to invest will inevitably grow over time” (Trainer 2012, 592), otherwise
the result is – as evidenced – ever-increasing amounts of debt. Related to the first point, this means
that in a degrowth system “almost the entire finance industry has to be scrapped, and replaced by
arrangements whereby money is made available, lent, invested etc., without increasing the wealth of
the lender” (Trainer 2012, 593). Furthermore, removing the growth imperative means that the quest
to get richer should somehow be replaced by “a collective effort to work out what society needs,
and organise to produce and develop those things” (ibid.). Trainer also argues that there could be no
concept of (surplus) profit and accumulation, as the problem of inequality would become even more
acute than it already is. Without growth, there could also be no market system which is essentially
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about maximising wealth and profit. Finally, the removal of growth would require removing the
(Western)  cultural  quest  “to get  richer,  to  accumulate  wealth  and property”  (ibid.).  What  these
various discussions seem to agree on is that challenging ideas and practices surrounding growth is a
highly radical and comprehensive project, much more so than what initially comes across in the
Transition  documents.  Sections  4.3.1.  (Economic  shift  towards  localisation  and  the  spread  of
cooperative forms of production)  and 5.2.2.  (Capitalism,  scientific  rationality and the values of
modern masculinity) will return to these thoughts.
 
4.1.5. The question of political inaction
Understanding the problems, the sources of resistance, that the Transition movement challenges is
certainly not complete without some regard for the political dimension. In terms of national and
international politics, the research material portrays a rather ambivalent position. On the one hand,
state  actors  are  criticised  and blamed as  not  doing anything  remotely meaningful  to  solve  the
problems, evident in comments such as “apart from a few notable exceptions, national leaders are
not stepping up to address these problems in any meaningful way”35 (Brangwyn & Hopkins 2008,
6); and
[a]ll  industrialised countries appear to operate on the assumption that our high levels of energy
consumption,  our  high  carbon  emissions,  and  our  massive  environmental  impact  can  go  on
indefinitely (What is a Transition Initiative? 2014, emphasis added). 
Similarly, statements such as “any rational examination […] tells us this can't go on much longer”
(ibid.) implies that political decision-makers are, in fact, behaving irrationally. There is also a clear
view that governments are aware of the likelihood and impact of peak oil and are  purposefully
covering up the information36. On the other hand, however, the very same (irrational and deceitful)
state  actors  are  also  simultaneously  placed  at  the  very  centre  of  the  solution  by  stating  that
“Transition  Initiatives  complement  [...]  [global  and national]  schemes  by making  sure  that  the
changes they demand in the way we live our day-to-day lives can actually be put into practice at
ground  level”  (Brangwyn  &  Hopkins  2008,  7).  The  overall  principle  of  non-confrontational,
constructive action also creates a somewhat confusing image that the movement is not in any way
political.  
35 See also: “We could dither about, waiting for technology or governments to solve the problem for is. However,
general consensus now appears to be that this is a rather high risk option.” (Brangwyn & Hopkins 2008, 7.)
36 See e.g.:“This report […] [was] buried by the US administration for close to a year. A perusal of the far-reaching
implications of the report give a clear indication why the government was so keen to keep it out of the public
domain.” (Brangwyn & Hopkins 2008, 6.)
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However, this aspect of non-confrontation appears to be partly a matter of 'operating below the
radar' (see Brangwyn & Hopkins 2008, 22) in order to avoid negative interference in Transition
activities. It also seems to reflect an acceptance that the state and its related strands and agencies are
here to stay and practical solutions to what is being viewed as extremely urgent environmental and
energy concerns also require state and other official action – taking an oppositional approach may
hinder rather than help this process37. Meaningful political action by the state (in this case, most
parliamentary democracies) is also viewed as unlikely as long as people's day-to-day lives support
individualistic, materialistic and growth-oriented socio-cultural and economic orientations (see e.g.
Brangwyn & Hopkins 2008, 7) and thus the emphasis is on changing these at grassroots level rather
than appealing to (or protesting 'against') states to force such changes from above.38 
Furthermore, from the point of view of appealing to wider audiences, it seems likely that a part of
the avoidance of 'politics' within the movement language relates to two parallel aspects. On the one
hand, there is a widespread disillusionment with the politics of states and parties (see e.g. Dalton
2004; Felicetti 2014), the usual understanding of the meaning of politics. Frustration with national
and  international  politics  is  indeed  also  evident,  despite  the  apparent  efforts  to  remain  non-
confrontational and optimistic39. On the other hand, there are also those who remain 'good citizens',
voters and supporters of parliamentary democracies and whose support is crucial  for successful
relocalisation efforts40 – explicit opposition to states and parties would undoubtedly alienate such
sections of the population (the majority in many places). Maintaining a non-political image may
thus cater for both types of audiences.  
Despite the ambivalence and the self-proclaimed non-confrontational nature of the movement, it
37 This is evident also in discussions concerning local governments, for example: “Whatever the degree of groundswell
your  Transition  Initiative  manages  to  generate,  however  many practical  projects  you’ve  initiated  and  however
wonderful your Energy Descent Plan is, you will not progress too far unless you have cultivated a positive and
productive relationship with your local authority. Whether it is planning issues, funding or providing connections,
you need them on board.” (Brangwyn & Hopkins 2008, 7.)
38 This is also supported by  comments, such as these: “Governments generally don't lead, they respond. They are
reactive, not proactive. It is essential that we remember that many of the decisions they will inevitably have to make
as part of preparing for Powerdown are perceived to be pretty much inconceivable from an electoral perspective.”
(Hopkins  2008,  Chapter  4:  Why  small  is  inevitable,  section  “Where  does  government  fit  in?”);  “Politically,
Transition is increasingly creating a culture where currently unelectable policies can become electable” (Hopkins
2011, 53).
39 See e.g. the blog post by Transition Network member Sophie Banks: “We also spoke about how we manage our
responses in order to go on living. I could let myself feel how much anger I have at the destructive behaviour of our
politicians and business 'leaders' that I just don’t get in touch with – if I let all the anger through and tried to act on it
I would burn out really fast.” (Banks blog entry 21.03.2014.) 
40 See e.g.: “Successful Transition Initiatives will need an unprecedented coming together of society” and therefore
“there is no room for 'them and us' thinking” (Hopkins 2011, 78; see also Principles 2014). 
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seems incorrect to claim that the Transition ideology is not in any way political.  As argued by
Hardt, “Transition's choice of practical, place-based forms and commitments is an ethical-political
one, based on the state's failure to meet crises of our times, and it has political effects” (2013, 4).
For her, the political  effects and implications rise particularly from the way that the movement
modifies common understandings of “community,  economy,  citizenship, and democracy” (Hardt
2013, 123). Indeed, I would also argue that challenging what is considered normal is an ultimate
form of politics and the political. As suggested by Rancière (1999, 28), the mainstream politics of
bureaucracies,  elections,  shifting  power  relations  within  the  state  and  the  economy,  and  the
procedures and justifications for such shifts could more accurately be called as the police (see also
May 2007, 23). Politics, on the other hand, should be reserved for 
whatever breaks with the tangible configuration… Political activity is whatever shifts a body from
the place assigned to it or changes a place’s destination. It makes visible what had no business being
seen, and makes heard a discourse where once there was only place for noise; it makes understood as
discourse what was once only heard as noise. (Rancière 1999, 29–30.)
Although one must  be  careful  not  to  over  idealise  the  impact  of  the  Transition  initiatives,  the
attempted shifts towards more collectivist values, community-based subjectivities, and cooperative
forms of labour (discussed further in subsequent sections) indeed strike as some highly political
activities that disrupt common ideas and discourses of 'normal'.41 Thus, the movement is certainly
political and implicitly calls into question the workings of national and global politics, even though
it does not explicitly 'oppose' them.    
4.1.6. Drawing the threads together: Dominant economic and socio-cultural 
structures and state inaction as the core targets of resistance
This section functions as a summary of the various threads and thus as a further elaboration into the
question of  what  is  being 'resisted'.  It  seems that  there are  multiple  levels of  analysis  into the
questions  of  cause  and  effect.  The  image  that  emerges  from the  whole  is  that  the  underlying
problems, the perceived causes, concern some of key aspects of Western modernity: the globalised,
'fossil-fuelled'  and  growth-based  (capitalist)  economic  system  and  its  mutually  dependent
relationship  to  the  individualistic,  materialistic  and  anthropocentric  practices,  values  and
worldviews of  ordinary people.  This relationship has  translated to another  set  of  problems,  the
perceived effects, which include at least ecological (including environmental and energy concerns),
41 The internal politics of the Transition movement – to the extent that it is possible to discuss them based on the
Transition Network documents – will be discussed in later sections.
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economic, and socio-cultural dimensions. Ecologically speaking, climate change is the most visible
and prominent manifestation of these problems, but by no means the only one. Socio-economically
speaking, the loss and precariousness of livelihoods42, the ever-increasing amounts of debt, and the
gross economic inequalities both within nations as well as globally are considered to be some of the
key  effects.  Finally,  from  a  socio-cultural  perspective,  it  is  the  increasing  lack  of  wellbeing,
cohesion, a sense of community, and intrinsic (or altruistic) values, social justice and equality that
are seen as some of the key aspects related to the dominant economic and socio-cultural structures.
It seems reasonable to argue that part of the role of peak oil rhetoric is to try and 'force' the desired
changes,  to  motivate  even  those  less  concerned  about  climate  change  or  economic  or  social
wellbeing to the processes of localisation. Therefore, the core sources and targets of resistance are
not peak oil and climate change (which are manifestations of deeper issues), but rather the dominant
socio-cultural and economic structures prevalent in most of the Western world, complemented and
maintained by the lack of action and responsibility on behalf of governments around the world.    
4.2. In come the Transition model
4.2.1. The “principles”, “steps”, and “stages”
After delving into the perceived problems, what follows are naturally the strategies and solutions.
The key solution offered is “a process of relocalising all essential elements that a community needs
to sustain itself and thrive” (Brangwyn & Hopkins 2008, 7). The strategy for achieving this involves
the Transition initiatives to act as a 'catalyst' for broader community action towards relocalisation43
and the wider  realisation that “the future with less oil, and producing less carbon emissions, could
be preferable to today” (Hopkins 2011, 72). But beyond such vague outlines, what exactly is the
Transition model? The stated principles that are meant to embody the Transition approach include
the following: 
1. Positive visioning […].
2. Help people access good information and trust them to make good decisions […].
3. Inclusion and openness […].
42 See e.g. “Transition is about creating a new, economically viable local infrastructure that creates livelihoods, skills
and resilience” (Social enterprise and entrepreneurship 2014).
43 See also the introduction in Transition Network website: “The aim of Transition is to help you be the catalyst in your
community for an historic push to make where you live more resilient, healthier and bursting with strong local
livelihoods, while also reducing its ecological footprint” (What 2014). Similarly: “the role of a Transition initiative
isn’t to do everything itself – to become a developer, a bank, an energy company, landowner, training organisation
and so on.  Rather,  its  work is  to  catalyse,  inspire  and  support  the efforts  to  make things happen,  helping the
emergent projects on the ground, as well as to structure itself so that, as much as possible, it enables and supports the
people developing those projects.” (Evolving structure 2014.)
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4. Enable sharing and networking […].
5. Build resilience […].
6. Inner and outer Transition […].
7. Subsidiarity: self-organisation and decision-making at the appropriate level […]. (Hopkins
2011, 77–78; see also Principles 2014.) 
What these principles seem to emphasise is a constructive, practical approach (no 1), decentralised
decision-making and diversity (no 2 and 7),  efforts  at  cross-societal  cooperation  (no 3 and 5),
collective resource and knowledge base (no 4), and addressing the psychological aspect of change
(no 6). Similarly, Hopkin's (2011, 79) list of Transition 'qualities' also include aspects, such as joyful
and constructive, open source, self-organising, and so on. However, although many of these aspects
certainly appear to resonate with the overall image of the Transition approach, there seem to be
some  problems  involved.  For  example,  the  issue  of  being  'open  source'  and  collective  seems
contradictory when the key publications – i.e. the books The Transition Handbook (Hopkins 2008),
The Transition Companion (Hopkins 2011), as well as The Power of Just Doing Stuff: How local
action can change the world (Hopkins 2013) – are available for purchase on the Transition Network
website  rather  than  freely available  (although the  first  two can  now be  found online  as  well).
Similarly,  the  training  courses  that  at  least  two  participants  of  each  Transition  initiative  are
supposed to take part in (two core courses, several more voluntary ones) are costly, each course
being approximately 100 pounds per person (see Becoming official; Courses 2014; Launch 2014).
This certainly sheds some doubts over the idea of not seeking profit and having open source, shared,
and collective resource and knowledge base. On the other hand, of course, anyone can adopt the
ideas of the Transition model without calling it Transition and in that regard it remains decidedly
open source. These matters also point to the multifaceted nature of decentralisation. It is interesting
how the Transition Network advocates the movement as decentralised when it simultaneously acts
as a form of authority with set  rules and criteria for the various Transition initiatives (see e.g.
Becoming official 2014). This aspects will be considered in further detail in the following section
on organisational structure.  
When it comes to the actual processes involved in Transition activities, the logic goes roughly as
follows: First, an initial group of people familiarises themselves with the Transition concept and the
issues of concern and then applies them to their local circumstances in an effort to reach out to local
people.  Second,  this  group  begins  awareness  raising  and  relationship-building  through  various
events and activities, such as movie screenings. Third,  provided that more people have become
interested, various groups are formed that each deal with different aspects of the Transition process,
such as food, energy, health, transport, psychology of change, economics and livelihoods, waste,
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and so forth. Fourth, each of these groups begin “practical projects such as community supported
agriculture, shared transport, local currencies, seed swaps, tool libraries, energy saving clubs, urban
orchards, reskilling classes, draught-busting teams”  (What is a Transition Initiative? 2014) and so
on. As these progress, more people (should ideally) become involved and more possible it becomes
to conduct “community-wide visioning processes” (ibid.). The core of such processes is the drafting
of an official Energy Descent Action Plan and beginning to rebuild local economies by setting up,
for example, “local energy companies, social enterprises, and cooperative food businesses” (ibid.).   
When the Transition Initiatives Primer was drawn up, the above process was represented as “The 12
Steps of Transition” (Brangwyn & Hopkins 2008, 24). Table 2 below summarises the content of
these 12 steps.
Step # Description
1. Set up a steering group
and  design  its  demise
from the outset 
This stage puts a core team in place to drive the project  forward during the
initial phases. […] Ultimately your Steering Group should become made up of 1
representative from each sub-group. 
2. Awareness raising This stage will identify your key allies, build crucial networks and prepare the
community in general for the launch of your Transition initiative.
3. Lay the foundations This stage is about networking with existing groups and activists, making clear
to them that the Transition Initiative is designed to incorporate their previous
efforts and future inputs by looking at the future in a new way. Acknowledge
and honour the work they do, and stress that they have a vital role to play. 
4.  Organise  a  Great
Unleashing
This stage creates a memorable milestone to mark the project’s “coming of age”,
moves it right into the community at large, builds a momentum to propel your
initiative  forward  for  the  next  period  of  its  work  and  celebrates  your
community’s desire to take action. 
5. Form working groups Part of the process of developing an Energy Descent Action Plan is tapping into
the collective genius of the community. Crucial for this is to set up a number of
smaller groups to focus on specific aspects of the process. Each of these groups
will develop their own ways of working and their own activities, but will all fall
under the umbrella of the project as a whole.
6. Use Open Space We’ve  found  Open  Space  Technology to  be  a  highly effective  approach  to
running meetings for Transition Initiatives. 
7.  Develop  visible
practical  manifestations
of the project
It is essential that you avoid any sense that your project is just a talking shop
where people sit around and draw up wish lists. Your project needs, from an
early stage, to begin to create practical, high visibility manifestations in your
community. 
8.  Facilitate  the  Great
Reskilling
If we are to respond to Peak Oil and Climate Change by moving to a lower
energy future and relocalising our communities,  then we’ll need many of the
skills that our grandparents took for granted. One of the most useful things a
Transition Initiative can do is to reverse the “great deskilling” of the last 40
years by offering training in a range of some of these skills. 
9. Build a Bridge to Local
Government
Whatever  the  degree  of  groundswell  your  Transition  Initiative  manages  to
generate,  however  many  practical  projects  you’ve  initiated  and  however
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wonderful your Energy Descent Plan is, you will not progress too far unless you
have cultivated a positive and productive relationship with your local authority.
Whether it is planning issues, funding or providing connections, you need them
on board. Contrary to your expectations, you may well find that you are pushing
against an open door. 
10. Honour the elders While  you clearly want  to  avoid any sense that  what  you are  advocating is
‘going back’ or ‘returning’ to some dim distant past, there is much to be learnt
from  how  things  were  done,  what  the  invisible  connections  between  the
different elements of society were and how daily life was supported. Finding out
all of this can be deeply illuminating, and can lead to our feeling much more
connected to the place we are developing our Transition Initiatives.
11.  Let  it  go  where  it
wants to go...
Although you may start out developing your Transition Initiative with a clear
idea of where it will go, it will inevitably go elsewhere. If you try and hold onto
a rigid vision, it will begin to sap your energy and appear to stall. Your role is
not to come up with all the answers, but to act as a catalyst for the community to
design their own transition. 
12.  Create  an  Energy
Descent Plan 
Each working group will  have been focusing on practical actions to increase
community resilience and reduce the carbon footprint. Combined, these actions
form the Energy Descent Action Plan. That’s where the collective genius of the
community has designed its own future to take account of the potential threats
from Peak Oil and Climate Change. 
Table 2: The 12 steps of Transition. Adapted from Brangwyn and Hopkins (2008, 24–28), see also Hopkins
2008, Chapter 11: How to Start a Transition Initiative; and Hopkins 2011, 78–79.   
When looking at  these 'steps',  what clearly seems to emerge as the most  important  part  of the
process is the drafting of an 'Energy Descent Action Plan'. This involves investigating the content
and extent of local resources (e.g. arable land, health provision, transport options, renewable energy
sources, building materials, and so on); creating a vision of the transformed community 15–20 years
later; listing a timeline and the steps needed in order to get to this vision; obtaining the official
development plan from local authorities (and modifying it accordingly);  publicising in all ways
possible the new vision of the community and the steps towards it; creating the first draft; and
finalising the Energy Descent Plan based on the feedback received (Brangwyn & Hopkins 2008,
30). 
However, although the Energy Descent Plan – which strikes as something that will then be handed
over to the local authorities – takes centre stage within the 12 steps, the process has since been re-
articulated further. The Transition model is now represented in further detail  and arguably with
more  ambition  in  the  Transition  Network  website  and  Hopkins'  2011  book  The  Transition
Companion as the 'ingredients' and the five 'stages' of Transition (see e.g. Ingredients 2014; Hopkins
2011, 92–289). The stages included are as follows: The first stage, “Starting out”, including issues
of organisation, social relations, communication within, scale, positive methods, partnerships, inner
aspects, and so on. The second stage,  “Deepening”,  includes matters such as practical projects,
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reskilling,  communication  with  other  actors,  reflecting,  taking  care  of  personal  wellbeing,
educational  pathways,  and  forth.  The  third  stage,  “Connecting”  concentrates  on  ways  to  “take
Transition to a wider audience” (Ingredients 2014) and includes aspects such as working with local
councils, local businesses, the elderly, the young, and other Transition initiatives. The fourth stage,
“Building”, goes beyond projects and towards concrete changes. It is here that the core idea of the
Transition model, as it currently stands, becomes clear: 
Transition groups aim ultimately to catalyse  the localisation of their  local  economy.  They
strive to move from running small community projects to thinking and acting much bigger.
New skills and ways of thinking will lead Transition initiatives to become social enterprises,
such  as  becoming  developers,  banks,  energy companies  and  so  on.  (Hopkins  2011,  234;
Ingredients 2014.) 
Indeed,  the  'ingredients'  in  this  section  include  not  only  the  above-mentioned  Energy Descent
Action Plans, but also forming social (cooperative) enterprises and strategic local infrastructure,
using intermediate technologies, catalysing community ownership of assets, and so on. Finally, the
fifth  stage,  “Daring  to  dream”,  relates  to  scaling  up  to  nation-wide  levels,  both  in  terms  of
government policies and the initiatives themselves. (Ingredients 2014.) While most of the aspects
within  the  building  process  will  be  discussed  further  when  examining the  actual  meaning and
content of 'resilience' and 'localisation', some of the core features of the Transition model that can be
drawn from the of the whole are the focus of the next two sections. 
4.2.2. Questions of organisational structure and strategy
The question of organisational structures, particularly their relationship to hierarchy and decision-
making models, is complex and the same applies to the Transition model. Similar to the relationship
to national and international politics, the approach to hierarchy comes across as highly ambivalent.
On the one hand there is a clear connection to decentralised, horizontal models of organisation, but
on the other hand there are also similar tendencies towards traditional hierarchical models. The
decentralised, horizontal element is evident, for example, in the above-mentioned principles and
qualities of Transition as well as in the way that 'leadership' is conceptualised:
[I]n a well-functioning group, anyone can exercise leadership for a while. 
Leadership is about inspiring others, taking initiative and helping a group find a direction that
they want to follow. That might entail some or all of the following roles: critical thinker, ideas
person, group harmony maintainer, driver, organiser, integrator/chair, external networker. 
Leadership doesn't  have to be about  power over a group, it  is  about  making a group feel
empowered. It is not about hierarchy, it is not about "who's boss", it's not about management
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and it's not about "followers". In particular, it's not about a permanent label that's applied to an
individual. (Brangwyn & Hopkins 2008, 34.)
Similarly,  it  is evident in the first 'step'  of Transition,  “[s]et  up a steering group and design its
demise from the outset” (Brangwyn & Hopkins 2008, 24; Hopkins 2008, Chapter 11: How to Start a
Transition Initiative; Hopkins 2011, 79) which is based on the idea of shared and changing roles of
leadership. This element is also found, for example, in the discussion on “Scaling up”:
Sometimes the people who initially led the smaller group cannot run a larger one. This can be
uncomfortable  for  all  involved.  As  a  group grows,  there’s  a  tendency for  those  with  the
loudest  voices  to  dominate.  A hierarchy appears,  tending  to  push  power  and information
upwards and out of the hands of those doing the work, which is where it should be. A more
suitable model for a Transition group is a network, which distributes information and power
rather than concentrating it. […] One inspiring example of a healthy, large organisation is the
Mondragon federation of cooperatives, based in the Basque region of Spain. (Scaling up 2014,
emphasis added)
However, there are also some contrary thought processes and features running parallel to these.
Firstly,  there is  a somewhat  problematic  argument  of urgency preventing the adoption of more
horizontal  models:  “we  haven't  got the time to spend all  our efforts  figuring out what [options
beyond traditional hierarchical models] look like” and “regarding consensus, it's great if time isn't a
really scarce resource”44 (Brangwyn & Hopkins 2008, 35). Similarly, the Transition Network as an
organisation has “adopted a temporary hierarchical structure, with a parallel process to find a more
suitable model that we'll adopt in time” (Brangwyn & Hopkins 2008, 35). Also the fact that the
Transition Network presents a  set  criteria  and process for groups that wish to become 'official'
Transition  initiatives  (see  Becoming  official  2014)  creates  an  image  where  the  Network  is
essentially an authority that stands above the various initiatives around the world. Sections on their
website and the Transition Companion (Hopkins 2011) also come across as highly authoritative, a
prominent example being a principle titled “How we communicate” (2014). Although it contains
useful information on being context sensitive when approaching people from different backgrounds,
the very title itself seems to represent a form of 'us and them' thinking – an implication that either
one must follow the advice or not call themselves a Transition initiative. It is likely that this is part
of the efforts to control the overall image of the movement, but it seems nonetheless somewhat
contradictory to many of the stated Transition principles.
44 In a similar vein: “Running through all of this decision-making and action-taking is the imperative of time. Climate 
Chaos isn't going to wait for us to get 100% consensus on every point, nor will fossil fuel depletion. Time may not be a 
challenge for your group. If it isn't, you're very fortunate. For the rest of us, we're encountering plenty of barriers to 
action outside of our groups. The last thing we need is to augment those barriers with our own personal psychological 
attachments to the dogma or paradigms of a certain way of working.” (Brangwyn & Hopkins 2008, 35.) 
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Overall, it seems reasonable to argue that the ambivalence towards questions of hierarchy is related
to the tensions between practical considerations and (red-green) ideological tendencies, particularly
the need to try and capture the interest and commitment of a highly diverse array of people. Brian
Davey's  (a  participant  at  Transition  Nottingham) passionate  response to  some of  the  criticisms
relating to the Transition movement takes the issue of leadership and hierarchy from the ideological
to the practical in a very telling way:
We  are  struggling  already  –  the  number  of  people  with  the  organisational  and  social
entrepreneurial skills to set things up is small. There are lots willing to follow but few willing,
or able, to lead – or we have not yet found the way to encourage and help people learn to lead,
to  learn  to  organise  and  to  become  social/environmental  entrepreneurs  (not  in  the  profit
seeking sense). Probably, mainly, this is because most people are used to working in large
organisations and they always assume that one has to start off too big and “build” things like
architects  and  developers  –  assembling  complex  organisational  structures  –  rather  than
develop through “planting things”, then tend them, letting them evolve and grow step by step.
(It is also because people have this habit of assuming, if something needs doing, that they
must “call on” politicians to do it […].) (Quoted in Hopkins 2009.)
It is certainly understandable that the constraints of what 'ordinary' people, and even many activists,
consider  as  normal  and  safe  (i.e.  hierarchical  structures)  cannot  be  completely  abandoned  or
sidelined – nor am I trying to argue that they necessarily have to be – if the idea is to gain a broad
support  and  activity  base.  Thus,  rather  than  advocating  a  single  organisational  solution,  the
Transition Network encourages each initiative to find the model that best  suits  their  locale and
culture, some more rooted in alternative cultures than others. Although a network form as such is
considered  desirable,  both  within  the  Transition  initiatives  (with  sub-groups  that  each  have  a
representative in so called 'steering group') and the movements as a whole45, what is presented as
more crucial is that initiatives agree on a clear purpose, some clear rules (e.g. meeting guidelines,
decision-making  principles,  communication  principles,  and  so  on),  and  methods  of  resolving
disputes (see e.g. Coming together as groups 2014). Thus, the questions of hierarchy and democracy
are left for each group to decide for themselves.  
In terms of strategy, the image that emerges from the research material could be described as the
optimistic diplomacy of 'transitional' change. Indeed, the strategy for gaining broader support and
membership (as per Hopkins and the Transition Network) seems to be based on a form of positive
diplomacy where one foot is always firmly in the present socio-cultural and economic structures
and the other  in  alternative futures.  Also,  as the description of the usual processes involved in
Transition activities reveals, change is sought slowly, from small projects gradually towards more
45 As stated in the Primer, the vision for the broader movement can be described as a “thriving cooperative network” 
(Brangwyn & Hopkins 2008, 13). 
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significant behavioural and structural changes. It seems that a constant negotiation is taking place
between the old and the new and it remains unclear whether the Transition initiatives are, in fact,
transforming  their  communities  or  are  the  communities  transforming  the  initiatives  into  more
moderate  forms  (or  whether  the  initiatives  and the  wider  communities  remain  separated).  This
approach nonetheless represents a clear departure from more oppositional methods towards change.
4.3. In the end: “Resilience and localisation”
The solutions advocated by the movement, particularly as represented by the Transition network,
are resilience and localisation. Resilience is understood as “the ability to respond and adapt to the
unexpected” (Why 2014), or “the capacity of our businesses, communities and settlements to deal
with shock” (Hopkins 2011, 78) which in practice is seen to mean things such as  “stronger local
economies,  increased  local  democracy,  strengthened  local  food  culture  and  more  local  energy
provision” (Hopkins 2008, Summing up Part 1: The oil age draws to a close). Resilience is also
elaborated on in the following way:  
Making  a  community  more  resilient,  if  viewed  as  the  opportunity  for  an  economic  and  social
renaissance, for a new culture of enterprise and reskilling, should lead to a healthier and happier
community while reducing its vulnerability to risk and uncertainty.  In practice, a more adaptable
community trains its young people in a wide range of skills, more decisions are taken at the local
level, the community owns and manages more of its own assets and has access to some of the land
adjoining it […]. (Hopkins 2011, 45.)
More theoretically, Hopkins (e.g. 2008, The three ingredients of a resilient system) relies on studies
of ecosystem resilience to describe the concept as having three core features: diversity, modularity,
and  tightness of feedbacks.  The first is seen to refer, within the context of communities, to the
diversity of elements (e.g. people, species, sources of food) that constitute a settlement, the diversity
of  connections  between  the  elements,  the  diversity  of  functions  and  livelihoods  within  each
settlement, the diversity of possible responses to changes in circumstances, the diversity in the use
of land, and the diversity of connections to other settlements. Modularity, on the other hand, refers
to the degree of self-organisation versus interdependence. A modular structure is viewed as one
where “the parts  of a system can more effectively organise in  the event of shock” (ibid.).  The
globalised food industry that relies on transportation is used as an example of a non-modular system
as the entire system becomes under challenge when one part – i.e. transportation – is threatened.
Finally, tightness of feedbacks is refers to “how quickly and strongly the consequences of a change
in one part of the system are felt and responded to in other parts” (ibid.). Centralised and globalised
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systems are viewed as having weak feedback signals, meaning that the effects of our actions are
spread far away and not necessarily detected in time. In contrast, localised systems are viewed as
having tight feedbacks; revealing the consequences of actions very quickly (ibid.).        
   
It is not surprising then that localisation is presented (on a more philosophical level) as “the concept
that  we  re-prioritise  the  local  and  re-value  the  human  being,  and  that  the  influence  of  huge
centralised  systems  begins  to  decline”  (Hopkins  2008,  Evaluating  possible  ways  forward).
However,  a  more practically oriented  characterisation is  evident  in  The Transition  Companion,
where localisation is presented essentially as follows: 
Increased meeting of local  needs through local  production […] (especially for food,  energy and
construction). […] A global network of communities localising their economies but sharing their
experiences and advice. […] The development, in parallel to existing businesses, of a more diverse,
more robust local economy, promoting social enterprise and community ownership of key assets and
businesses. […] [A] wider diversity of skills [...]. Intensive [local] food production […]. (Hopkins
2011, 48.)
The overall image that emerges is that on a practical level, resilience and localisation refer mostly to
economic aspects, but a wider understanding also includes some key questions of socio-cultural and
political nature. All of these will be examined in further details in the following three sections.
4.3.1. Economic shift towards localisation and the spread of cooperative forms of 
production   
It is evident throughout the research material that economic aspects play a crucial, in many ways
the  most crucial,  part  of  the  process.  This  is  supported  by  countless  statements,  such  as  the
following:
[Transition] is not about the ‘greening’ of society – its gradually becoming more ‘environmentally
friendly’ – it is about a shift in focus, enabling resilience at all levels and fast-tracking the creation of
a more appropriate and, where possible, localised economy (Policies for Transition 2014).
Transition groups aim ultimately to catalyse the localisation of their local economy. They strive to
move from running small community projects to thinking and acting much bigger. New skills and
ways of thinking will  lead Transition initiatives to become social  enterprises,  such as becoming
developers, banks, energy companies and so on. (Hopkins 2011, 234; Ingredients 2014.) 
This idea of the localised economy is embodied particularly in the REconomy project. At the heart
of this project is the concept and practice of a Transition-oriented Enterprise (TE). This is defined
as:  
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a financially viable trading entity [meaning that it at least meets costs, and means of exchange other
than  money may be  used]  that  fulfils  a  real  community need,  delivers  social  benefits  and  has
beneficial, or at least neutral, environmental impacts (What's a Transition-oriented enterprise? 2014).
Accordingly, a Transition-oriented Enterprise is portrayed as having five characteristics: resilience
outcomes; appropriate resource use; appropriate localisation; more than profit; and being a part of
the community.  The first of these,  resilience outcome,  means that the enterprise is supposed to
contribute  to  the  local  community's  ability  to  respond  and  adapt  to,  for  example,  energy  and
resource shortages, impacts of climate change, and economic uncertainty (and does not cause harm
elsewhere) and is also resilient in itself through financial sustainability and independence (as much
as possible) from external funding. The second characteristic,  appropriate resource use, refers to
minimising the use of fossil fuels, respecting the limits of all natural resources, and “minimising
and integrating waste streams” (ibid.).  The third factor,  appropriate localisation,  means that the
enterprise operates “at a scale appropriate to the environment, economy and business sector with
regard  to  sourcing,  distribution  and  interaction  with  the  wider  economy”  (ibid.).  The  fourth
characteristic, more than profit, refers to the goal of an enterprise which is “to provide affordable,
sustainable products and services and decent livelihoods rather than to generate profits for others”.
Finally,  the fifth and last  trait,  being a part of  the community,  means that the enterprise works
“towards building a common wealth, owned and controlled as much as is practical by their workers,
customers, users, tenants and communities” with “structures or business models which are as open,
autonomous, equitable, democratic, inclusive and accountable as possible” (ibid.).   
The REconomy project report “The New Economy in 20 Enterprises” (2013) shows, as the title
suggests, 20 case studies of enterprises that are presented as 1) being sustainable; 2) offering social
benefits; 3) having shared ownership; and 4) providing essential goods and services for the local
community (op. cit., 3). They are described as representing “a new kind of community-led, place-
based economy” which is geared towards meeting basic needs, particularly in the areas of food,
energy,  transport,  housing, health,  finance,  and waste (ibid.).  However,  a closer examination of
these examples of the 'new economy'  reveals some slightly contradictory aspects in light of the
'anti-growth' argument presented earlier. Firstly, there is a continued emphasis on the market in the
way that  're-localisation'  is  presented as “the market  opportunity”  (op.  cit.,  7),  thus implying a
profit-oriented perspective. Secondly,  many of the enterprises have paid (non-owner) employees
and unpaid volunteers, and make surplus profits and interest payments to owners (who may or may
not be workers). Of course, most of these also have democratic decision-making structures (even
within hierarchical models), low rates of interest payments (if any), and a large part of the profits
51
are allocated to provide funds for community projects. As such, they do appear to represent a certain
shift from excessive consumerism to meeting basic needs in more democratic, cooperative ways.
4.3.2. Socio-cultural shift towards intrinsic values
The  socio-cultural  part  of  the  solution  is  evident,  for  example,  in  the  way that  'Transition'  is
portrayed as “a cultural shift”, “an inner process”, and “storyteller” (Hopkins 2011, 72–76). The
required cultural change is not presented as the need to adopt a completely new set of values, but as
the need to shift the emphasis from 'extrinsic' values – those relating to the perceptions of others,
such as status, wealth, power and so on – towards more 'intrinsic' values already within all of us –
such as those related to a sense of community, family, nature, and self-development (Hopkins 2011,
74–75).  This  is  also  a  core  part  of  the  overall  'inner  process'  towards  “the  qualities  that  this
transition  calls  forth  –  a  move from materialism to  values  such as  community,  care,  love  and
creativity;  from arrogance and inequality to compassion” (Creating a space for inner Transition
2014). The concept of 'inner Transition' is based on the idea that “we shape our physical world in
response to what we value and believe, and our values and beliefs are in turn shaped by the world
around us” and therefore “Transition cannot be just about material change, such as putting up solar
panels and planting trees” (Hopkins 2011, 73). What the processes of inner Transition are presented
as drawing inspiration from are three areas of thought: psychology and ecopsychology (e.g. the
view that our relationship to the Earth is significantly affects our psychology); Eastern traditions'
insights on the transformation of consciousness; and Earth-centred wisdom on living sustainably,
mainly from various indigenous peoples around the world (Creating a space for inner Transition
2014). Therefore, it seems reasonable to argue that the ideological and discursive aspects of change
have a key role to play as a socio-cultural solutions advocated by the movement. 
4.3.3. Political shift: Reconciling community empowerment and state action   
As  suggested  by  Quilley  (2011,  10),  “Transition  is  a  movement  of  liberal,  highly  educated
cosmopolitans with left-liberal political inclinations and a strong attachment to the institutions of
liberal-social democracies”. This certainly resonates with the research material which, granted, only
provides the view from the top of the movement, not its variety. Nonetheless, the view that emerges
is one where there are parallel processes of community empowerment and a continuing belief that
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states  will  eventually  'do  the  right  thing'.  This  dual  aspect  is  present  in  much of  the  research
material, but it is particularly pronounced in a recent blog post by Hopkins:
How would it be if we, as an international movement, ran an international campaign in the run up to
COP21 [21st Conference of the Parties on Climate Change 2015] which, rather than the kind of "you
should be doing this" type campaign that never seems to get anywhere, was instead a "look what
we're already doing" campaign. […] In doing so we perhaps do what has never been possible in
previous negotiations like COP, we take the fear out of the necessary changes, we show that we aren't
waiting for  their  permission, and that  communities  are  thriving,  rediscovering each other  again,
creating new economies and feeling inspired and driven in a way they never have before. (Hopkins
blog entry 02.04.2014.)
Indeed, when it comes to the relationship to states and governments, there is a clear contradiction
between the idea of moving away from centralised systems and simultaneously and persistently
legitimising their existence in the sphere of institutional politics. However, this is perhaps the area
where the research material falls short; for example the four case studies conducted by Felicetti
(2014) demonstrated that 
the overwhelming majority of Transition participants I interviewed were highly critical of politics.
Comments  ranged  from  politics  being  'detached  from  the  people'  to  'a  business  committee'.
Moreover,  although  observation  suggests  that  some  local  leaders  may  closely  abide  to  a  non-
adversarial attitude and be willing to engage with institutions, the bulk of ordinary participants may
struggle  to  welcome  this  development.  […]  The  existence  of  a  non-adversarial  ideology  in  a
movement does not  guarantee that  participants will  leave behind their  (more or less adversarial)
views. (Felicetti 2014, 12.) 
Nonetheless, the solution advocated from the top seems to be one where the power of communities
to take part in the construction of their futures is reconciled with the power of centralised political
systems, however complex that relationship proves to be.   
5.  OBJECTIVIST  EXPLANATION:  THE  TRANSITION
MOVEMENT AND THE POLITICS OF RESISTANCE 
This chapter reconstructs and re-examines the empirical analysis established in chapter four through
the  critical-theoretical  'objectivist'  explanation,  focusing  on  the  conceptual  vocabulary  of  the
politics of resistance. It aims to answer the questions of how is the Transition movement a form of
politics of resistance and how can this  case study help to advance IR's understanding of social
movements and the politics of resistance. The first part discusses the why, meaning the targets of
change and resistance contained in the Transition narrative; the second part the how, meaning the
key methods of resistance; and the third part the overall image of resistance that emerges from the
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whole. Discussion will then proceed to the more immediate insights and implications, namely the
contradictory and complex nature of the movement's politics of resistance. Finally, consideration
will  be  given  to  the  theoretical  implications  and  the  contributions  of  the  analysis  to  IR's
understanding of social movements and the politics of resistance.
5.1. The 'why': Globalisation, capitalism, scientific rationality and the values of
modern masculinity 
After the empirical analysis, it is now useful to return to the theoretical and conceptual frameworks
introduced in chapter two. First and foremost, it is clear that the solution of localisation is directly
related to the processes of globalisation.  More specifically,  it  is related to economic,  neoliberal
globalisation both in terms of globalised production and distribution systems and in terms of the
power of large corporations. The concerns relating to the globalised production and distribution
system seem to be primarily of environmental,  social,  and economic nature.  As indicated,  long
supply chains are seen as placing high strains on the environment, particularly in the form carbon
emissions; they are also seen as having weak feedback mechanisms that make it easier to ignore
ecological destruction and global inequalities in a great variety of issues; and the centralised and
globalised forms of production (referring here to the way that, say, many food, manufacturing, and
clothing  industries  are  concentrated  in  particular  areas  of  the  world)  are  seen  to  jeopardise
livelihoods and the ability to withstand sudden changes in communities around the world. Similarly,
the power of large corporations is  seen as draining local economies  and livelihoods as well  as
creating mono-cultures (both in terms of culture and in terms of production) that are particularly
detrimental to local 'resilience', understood as the ability to respond and adapt to changes. The role
of  peak  oil  arguments  is  to  'force'  the  practical  view that  globalised  forms  of  production  and
distribution  cannot  continue  without  becoming increasingly unaffordable  to  the  majority of  the
human population. 
However, there is a certain lack of attention given to the role of global and national politics – a
matter which separates the Transition movement from other movements that are explicitly against
the  neoliberal  form of  globalisation.  As characterised by Gills  (2000a,  4),  neoliberal  economic
globalisation does not refer only to globalised production and distribution or the power of capital,
but also to the political exclusion of dissident social forces, the key role of market ideology in state
policies  and state  forms,  and the  power  of  transnationalised  institutions  which  facilitate  global
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capital  accumulation.  It  is  likely that  this  avoidance  of  'politics'  relates  to  the  need  to  remain
positive and constructive; to engage with the mainstream rather than stay confined to those from
existing activist and counter-culture backgrounds; and to continue 'operating under the radar' and
thus avoid powerful enemies. However, although this rationale is understandable, it is nonetheless
problematic. Some of the key grievances of past movements, including the undemocratic nature of
transnational institutions, the lack of accountability of transnational corporations, the relationship
between corporate money and electoral politics, and the role of neoliberal ideology in (particularly
Western)  state  policies,  are  arguably  directly  related  to  the  continuation  of  growth-oriented
economic globalisation. Avoiding these aspects and believing that governments will  one day be
convinced by the example set by the Transition movement and radically alter their policies, seem to
be founded on a highly limited understanding of the interrelatedness of our dominant political and
economic systems. On the other hand, resisting globalisation by building small-scale alternatives
and  experimenting  with  forms  of  community  empowerment  may  yet  prove  more  fruitful  in
transforming the mindsets of ordinary people than the politics of public protest. 
Beyond these questions of globalisation, some key aspects of capitalism, scientific rationality and
modern masculine values also play a crucial role in the Transition form of politics of resistance.
Indeed, if capitalism is to be understood in Paterson's terms as relating to the growth-imperative,
commodification,  profit  maximation,  and inequalities,  Transition certainly represents  some anti-
capitalist tendencies. As demonstrated, there is an explicit opposition to the key role of economic
growth in the political economy today even though there may be a lack of understanding of what
this  entails.  For  example,  the  continued  acceptance  of  the  legitimate  role  of  interest  payments
represents a growth-based logic which seems to go unrecognised. Also, even though the Transition
ideology seems  to  resist  the  logic  of  commodification  (the  emphasis  being  in  democratic  and
cooperative forms of business and exchange models), in practice it also has no qualms about the
continuance of, for example, wage-labour. Similarly, although profit maximation is considered as
undesirable, there is still an acceptance of the logic that investments are made using capital and
these are used to generate (if possible) surplus profit. Granted, the fact that most of this surplus
profit is then redirected to socially beneficial projects is a step into a different direction. The final
aspect of inequality is also resisted through the promotion of democratic cooperatives and continued
references to global inequalities and the issues of local 'social  justice'  and 'equity'.  However,  in
practice the Transition 'new economy' has very few methods of economic redistribution beyond the
social investments made with profits. Thus, the end result is a mixture of the old and the new,
containing both affirmations of and challenges to the logic of capitalism.  
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Similarly, the relationship to scientific and technocratic rationality is multifaceted and complex. On
one  hand,  the  view  of  human-nature  duality,  the  basis  of  the  anthropocentric  and  scientific
worldview, is clearly resisted. Similarly, technocratic rationality is resisted in the way that control of
local lands and livelihoods are seen as belonging in the hands of those who depend on them, the
local communities. However, the language of the movement simultaneously emphasises scientific
rationality by trying to appeal to people through highly scientific figures and information. Similarly,
the question of political control seems to be left in the hands of technocratic structures. There are
references to increased local democracy, but the these are not elaborated on. Thus, again, there are
diverse elements involved, a negotiation between traditional and alternative forms. 
Finally, the values of modern masculinity – individualism, instrumental rationality, and domination
– are  also  a  key aspect  that  seems to  be  continually resisted  and negotiated  in  the  Transition
approach. Firstly, there is a pronounce tendency to promote a transition from individualistic to more
collectivist values and worldviews, represented for example by the focus on communities rather
than  individuals,  intrinsic  rather  than  extrinsic  values,  and  an  Earth-centred  rather  than
anthropocentric worldview. Indeed, there is very little mention of people as individuals, the point of
identification and subjectivity is clearly in communities. Also ownership – of businesses, land, and
so  on  –  is  also  presented  as  belonging  to  the  collective  rather  than  individuals,  thus  clearly
challenging some of the (masculine) values of modern societies. Similarly, the emphasis on hand-
based skills, more 'feminine' forms of work (e.g. farming, health care, and so on), and taking care of
the  community  through  socially  beneficial  projects  challenge  the  logics  of  individualism  and
instrumental rationality.  However,  although the promotion of network-like,  democratic forms of
organisation – both internally and in businesses and the wider community – contest the logic of
domination and hierarchy, there are also contradictory elements that support these. Nonetheless, this
is  also  a  question  that  is  highly  complex;  even  if  official  hierarchies  do  not  exist,  unofficial
hierarchies  may (and usually do) form which are much harder,  if  not  impossible,  to  subject to
democratic  control  (see  e.g.  Juris  2008,  18).  Thus,  in  some  cases,  instituting  transferable,
democratically  controlled  official  hierarchies  may be  a  way to  contain more  durable  forms  of
domination.  
What this discussion on the question of 'why' demonstrates is that the Transition movement both
confirms and challenges various conceptions of the subject matter. Within the realm of 'why', it is
notable how the narrative embodies a highly specific, yet multifaceted portrayal of the terrain of
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resistance.  It  confirms  the  neo-Marxist  and  neo-Gramscian  understanding  that  the  politics  of
resistance is often motivated by the crises related to a globalising capitalist system (see e.g. Cox
1999; Morton 2002; Rupert 2003; Gill 2008), but it does not appear to share their explicitly class-
based ontology. Furthermore, rather than focusing on various transnational political and economic
elites as the targets of resistance, the movement considers ordinary people as the key agents and
targets of change. In this view, it is the social relations between people that constitute a structure,
such as the capitalist system, and therefore a slow transformation of those relations constitute a slow
transformation of the system itself. It is also notable that the multiple causes of resistance, which
relate to fundamental philosophical questions relating to Western modernity (such as human-nature
duality,  individualism,  and  instrumental  rationalism),  cannot  be  reduced  to  globalisation  or
capitalism, even though they are arguably interrelated in many ways (see Paterson 2001, 40–52). 
 
5.2.  The  'how':  Transforming  popular  common  sense  through  principled
pragmatism and positive direct action  
As already implied, a core method in the Transition movement's politics of resistance is challenging
aspects of  'popular  common sense',  the “amalgam of  historically effective ideologies,  scientific
doctrines and social mythologies” (Rupert 2003, 185). The suggested creation of new stories and
myths – e.g. the 'genius of communities' rather than technology or global politics  – is one aspect of
challenging and transforming the common sense of many places. Another interrelated aspect is the
ways in which the movement ideology challenges some of the core values of modern masculinity
discussed in the previous section. Of course none of this is a matter of totality; some aspects are
challenged while  others  are  confirmed and legitimised.  The relationship  to  global  and national
politics is particularly ambiguous; on one hand, the notion that power and subjectivity reside in the
local and everyday challenges popular common sense of who is able to bring about meaningful
change, but on the other hand, the institutions of liberal democracies are mostly left unchallenged.
This clearly implies a lack of understanding by Hopkins and the Transition Network of the key role
that  states  themselves  play,  not  only in  issues  of  globalisation,  but  also  in  the  continuation  of
competitive, anthropocentric values and worldviews (see e.g. Paterson 2001, 42–45; Eriksson &
Andersson  2010,  125).  However,  trying  to  appeal  to  people  from  all  walks  of  life  while
simultaneously  pursuing  fairly  radical  objectives  (e.g.  localised,  cooperatively  organised
economies) inevitably requires confirming some aspects of popular common sense while trying to
transform others.  This view is also confirmed by Benford and Snow (e.g.  2000, 618–619) who
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argue that successful collective action frames, or movement narratives, must somehow appeal to
values and beliefs that resonate with the wider socio-cultural setting in which they are invoked. Of
course, utilising the same core narrative in a variety of socio-cultural settings may be problematic
and ineffective in drawing support.       
 
Secondly,  the  Transition  form of  resistance  also  has  clear  points  of  resemblance  with  feminist
activism identified by Eschle and Maiguashca (2007). Similar to the feminist 'anti-globalisation'
activists,  the  practices  and goals  included  in  the  Transition  model  vary from the  material  and
instrumental  (e.g.  economic  gains  through  new  livelihoods)  to  the  self-developmental   and
ideational (e.g. so called 'inner Transition' and wider cultural change); they aim to appeal to a wide
variety of audiences (e.g. authorities, businesses, other activists, ordinary people); and they use a
variety  of  methods  (e.g.  discursive,  behavioural,  psychological).  Similarly,  there  is  some
recognition of potential power hierarchies within the initiatives and suggestions for ways in which
to try and overcome or ameliorate these. In a word, they reflect Eschle and Maiguashca's concept of
principled  pragmatism (2007,  294–297)  in  the  way  that  they  rely  on  certain  core  principles
(epitomised  by their  grand  narrative  and  the  principles  of  action)  and  the  experience  base  of
pioneering initiatives, but simultanously encourage experimentation and a diversity of practices.   
Finally,  the  prefigurative  element  provides  a  third  angle  on  the  key methods  contained  in  the
Transition form of politics of resistance. Although the Transition model does not quite live up to the
normative understanding of prefigurative politics as forms of activism that are based on horizontal
and decentralised organisational structures,46 It does, however, represent the prefigurative idea of an
'ethically consistent relationship between means and ends (the end referring here to matters such as
the respect for diversity, rather than the end of hierarchy per se). Similarly, it also represents the
views of prefigurative movements as those that follow the Gandhian notion to 'be the change you
wish to see in the world', meaning that they seek to realize in the here and now the transformations
envisioned for the future (see Brissette 2013, 223). This is also reflected in the concept of positive
direct  action which  is focused on doing and creating  in  the  present  the  desired  structures  and
processes of the future (Milstein 2010, 70). The Transition form of prefigurative politics – one that
does not automatically refer to the removal of official  hierarchies, but is  based on constructive
direct action – could perhaps be more appropriately termed as 'pragmatic prefigurativism'.  It  is
positive direct action that is practical and experimental, based on activities and principles that are
46 As discussed,  the  Transition  model  does  not  foreclose  the  use  of  hierarchical  models  and  even  the  Transition
Network has a hierarchical structure. 
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considered as long-term (rather than temporary or instrumental), but they do not necessarily reflect
a form of 'power-free social engagement' (Howard & Pratt-Boyden 2013, 233). Indeed, here-in lies
the problem with prefigurative politics whose content is  predetermined in this form; the quest for
power-free social engagement may, as discussed earlier, give rise to unofficial hierarchies that are
much harder to control than democratic, temporary forms of official hierarchies47. 
All of these aspects constitute a very different portrayal of resistance compared to more widespread
understandings of the topic as loud declarations of discontent by representatives of global civil
society (see e.g. Colás 2002). Although feminists, such as Eschle and Maiguashca (2007; 2005b)
have already drawn attention to the multiple methods and locations of resistance, the constructive,
positive  side  of  resistance  seems  to  have  been  mostly  overlooked  within  critical  IR  theorists.
Indeed,  this  is  the key contribution of  'pragmatic  prefigurativism';  the  recognition  that  positive
forms of direct action can also be a method of resistance.      
5.3. The 'what': Covert, everyday resistance and place-based globalism  
Returning to  Hollander and Einwohner's typology of resistance, it seems reasonable to argue that
the Transition approach represents a form of covert resistance, or 'oppositional activity' that is not
necessarily recognised as resistance by its so called targets (Hollander & Einwohner 2004, 545–
546). To clarify, 'oppositional' was described as having a variety of meanings, such as contradicting,
challenging, aiming to change, rejecting, and damaging or disrupting (op. cit.,  538). The covert
nature of resistance is manifested most of all in the non-confrontational, everyday or 'low-profile'
resistance (op. cit., 539) portrayed in the movement narrative. This is evident particularly in the
explicit recommendation to  'operate under the radar' to avoid both victims and enemies (Brangwyn
& Hopkins 2008, 22). Furthermore, although the emphasis is in positive solutions and the avoidance
of  explicit  opposition,  the  solutions  themselves  clearly  challenge  particular  socio-cultural  and
economic structures. Trying to change them is inherently a key aspect in the Transition form of
politics  of  resistance.  However,  it  is  also  notable  that  the  difference  between  resistance  and
complicity  is  difficult  to  determine  or  maintain.  For  example,  protests  that  aim  to  change  a
government policy (e.g. on same sex marriages, or carbon emissions) are immediately identified as
47 For example, the research by Milkman, Luce and Lewis (2013) demonstrated that the overarching principle of 
horizontalism that was meant to disrupt hierarchies and existing social categories in many ways enabled the 
marginalization of various categories of people, such as women, sexual minorities, and people of colour, while the 
participation of the educated, white males would (yet again) gain a more visible and pronounced position (op. cit., 
31–32).  
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resistance, or oppositional activity, but they also simultaneously support and affirm governments as
legitimate decision-makers in such matters (see e.g. Day 2004). The resistance of one thing (e.g.
policy) actually becomes complicity in another (e.g. the political system). Similarly, the Transition
narrative  represents  a  resistance  to  particular  aspects  of  dominant  socio-cultural  and  economic
structures in most of the OECD world, as well as to the lack of sufficient action demonstrated by its
political  elites,  but it  also simultaneously affirms other related aspects.  What this  demonstrates,
more than anything,  is  that  it  is  highly important  to  not only focus  on the explicit  (i.e.  public
protest), but also consider the wider circumstances and impact of 'resistance'.    
Moving on to the aspect that perhaps most of all embodies the movement's clear relevance to IR;
that of place-based globalism (as utilised by Gibson-Graham 2008). This concept draws attention to
the  artificial  and unsustainable  separation  between local  and global,  national  and international,
inside and outside (Walker 1993). It  emphasises local action as the site of ”a global politics of local
transformations” and highlights the transformative potential of place-based politics replicated across
the globe (Gibson-Graham 2008, 660, 662). The Transition narrative clearly mirrors this idea. It is a
form of economic and social transformation that is place-based yet global (both in ideology and,
through its  network form, in practice).  Furthermore,  it  confirms ”the centrality of  subjects  and
ethical practices of self-cultivation” (ibid.) through the efforts to shift identifications, subjectivities,
values and worldviews towards more collectivist, communal, intrinsic and 'Earth-centred' forms. It
also embodies the ”everyday temporality of change and the vision of transformation as a continual
struggle  to  change  subjects  and  places  and  conditions  of  life  under  inherited  circumstances  of
difficulty and uncertainty” (ibid.). This is reflected particularly in the combination of material and
ideational change of everyday life and the constant negotiation between the old and the new, the
historical conditions (again both material and ideational) and the diverse visions of transformation.
The key is in transforming local economies and minds in the now and in the everyday, towards a
range of 'postcapitalist' practices, in the face of globalisation (see op. cit., 662).  
Change in this imaginary – and indeed in the Transition model – is based on the power of small-
scale, local action that focuses on the possibilities of the present. These are 'places' whose attempts
at  change  and resistance  are  rooted  in  transcending  many familiar  structures  and  narratives;  a
politics  of  re-articulation,  subjectivation  and  becoming.  Of  course  there  are  also  contradictory
elements, as discussed in previous sections, but these do not make the efforts any less meaningful.
The key ís not a totalitarian stance where every action has to represent a postcapitalist logic; it is
rather  the  imperfect  struggle  to  change  the  normal  and  the  mundane  under  circumstances  of
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difficulty and uncertainty. This is certainly a view that differs very significantly from the image of
politics of resistance contained in the idea of 'global civil society' as a massive, globally organised
counter-hegemonic force or a ”postmodern transnational political party” (Gill 2000, 138).  
5.4. The contradictory and complex nature of the politics of resistance
One of the key lessons that can be drawn from examining the Transition narrative is that 'resistance'
is a highly contradictory phenomenon – a view that poststructuralists such as Amoore (2006) are
acutely aware of. As already revealed, a core criticism contained in the narrative concerns economic
growth and economic globalisation, but the Transition model nonetheless reveals an acceptance of
some explicitly  growth-based practices  (e.g.  interest  rates).  It  also claims  to  focus  on  intrinsic
values, but simultaneously practices instrumental, 'extrinsic' rhetoric (e.g. localisation as the market
opportunity).  The insistence on being non-confrontational and non-political  also seems to be in
contradiction with the explicit criticisms of state inaction; the highly political subject matters and
behaviours; and the central role of direct action. The mere existence of the Transition movement, it's
core rationale for action (e.g. 'if we wait for governments, it'll be too little, too late'), is a criticisms
of state  inaction,  thus making it  a form of confrontation and challenge.  Of course,  this  is  also
complemented  by the  reformist  view that  the  Transition  movement  is  paving  way to  eventual
government action.  
Nevertheless, what this case confirms is that dichotomies, such as  power / resistance, or refusal /
complicity, can be highly misleading. Indeed, the Transition movement itself embodies all of these
aspects in one way or another. It challenges and resists the perceived inaction of official politics, but
simultaneously embraces the continuation of state power alongside its efforts towards community
empowerment. The movement itself also represents a form of power, tries to empower, and contains
different  power  relations  within  –  all  of  which  are  highly  political  aspects,  yet  mostly
unacknowledged as such in any explicit manner by the Transition Network. However, rather than
making  the  movement  non-political,  it  only  highlights  the  limited,  although  widespread,
understanding of politics and the political as the realm of political parties and states. Overall, the
politics  of  resistance  contained  in  the  Transition  movements  is  thus  one  of  ambiguities  and
revelations – understanding these will benefit not only the movement members themselves, but also
any IR scholar willing to see beyond state-centric conceptions of politics, resistance, and power.
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5.5. Expanding IR's understanding of social movements and the politics of 
resistance
As stated  in  the  introduction,  a  core  argument  and finding of  this  thesis  is  that  the Transition
movement represents a different kind of 'transnational social movement'  and a different kind of
politics of resistance compared to the more explicitly  political forms engaging in public protest
demonstrations.  Common  understandings  of  transnational  social  movements  emphasise
characteristics, such as membership in multiple nations, their confrontational methods, and their
international, clearly defined targets (see Tarrow 2001, 11; Khagram et al. 2002, 8). The locally
based  Transition  movements  (Transition  initiatives),  with  their  diverse,  non-confrontational
methods, and ordinary people's everyday practices and mindsets as the primary targets of change,
do not easily fit this image. Does that mean that they cannot be considered as 'transnational' or
relevant to IR? On the contrary, there are multiple aspects that make the movement transnational:
physically through the  transnational network  of Transition movements;  discursively through the
globally  framed  justifications  and  criticisms;  and  ideologically  through  the  aspirations  for
transnational, potentially global changes. There are also multiple aspects that make the movement
political and relevant to IR without the need for 'contentious interactions with powerholders' (e.g.
Tarrow 2001, 11). The most important of these concerns the deep interconnections between the
social,  economic,  and political;  trying  to  reconfigure social  and economic  relations  is  a  highly
political act that also directly impacts the workings of official politics. As already argued, “it is
contestations at the micro-level, over the intricacies of everyday life, that provide the raw material
for global domination, and the key to disrupting global strategies of domination (Kulynych 1997,
337, referencing Foucault 1980). The same thought echoes in the concept of place-based globalism
and its idea of a global politcs of local transformations. Therefore, it is extremely important that we
expand our practical and theoretical horizons to also realise the world political importance of social
movements in their multiple forms, methods, targets, and locations. Only then can we understand
their potential for more radical transformations.   
When it comes to the politics of resistance, it is similarly clear that focusing on the workings of
transnational public protest demonstrations only captures certain aspects of the topic. Resistance,
understood most of all as striving to change or prevent something, is a multifaceted phenomenon
that extends beyond the explicit. Similarly, politics and the political does not necessarily require a
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focus on political and economic elite; engaging in questions of power (whether material, discursive,
or ideological in its orientation), or the ”struggle over the resources and arrangements that set the
basic terms of our practical and passionate relations” (Unger 1987, 145–146), represent an ultimate
form of politics. Thus, opening one's eyes to the radical and political potential of  seemingly non-
political movements is an avenue of research that critical IR scholars would do well to explore.  
 
6.  PERSONAL  EXPLORATION  AND  CONSTRUCTIVIST
EXPLANATION: THOUGHTS ON POSITIONALITY AND THE
RESEARCH PROCESS 
Reflecting back on the research process and the identity and impact of the researcher is a key aspect
of critical theories (especially those of feminist orientation). This short chapter carries out such
reflection in the context of a narrative, hermeneutic 'exploration' of personal experience and identity
within  this  research.  Towards  the  end,  the  narrative  engages  in  a  more  explicit,  constructivist
explanation of the research process. The function of the personal narrative, as already indicated, is
multiple: it disrupts assumptions of the researcher as a distanced spectators; it represents an attempt
at self-liberation from the masculine, logico-scientific ideals of 'scientific' analysis; and it lays bare
my own role and position in this thesis.   
To  begin  with,  it  has  no  doubt  become  clear  that  the  topic  of  this  thesis  is  highly  personal.
Somewhat surprisingly however, it feels as if though different elements of the thesis directly reflect
different aspects of my personality and identity. For one, the multitude of theories and analytical
methods employed is a direct reflection of my personality; the difficulty of making decisions and,
more importantly, the tendency to focus on the larger picture, the way different aspects interact and
intertwine, rather than some specific detail of any given topic (in other words, a tendency towards
holistic  rather  than  atomistic  viewpoints).  When my research  plan  was reviewed by my peers,
suggestions were made to take a more narrow focus or choose a  specific aspect of a given theory,
but such a narrow approach seemed impossible. My perception was that it could not do justice to
either the empirical 'object' (seeing myself as a 'critical friend' who had a duty not to undermine or
over-idealise their efforts) or the theoretical richness involved in it. It may be that the theoretical
multiplicity and complexity has made this a challenging piece to take in, but I would make many of
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the same choices had I the chance to restart this thesis from the beginning (although I might be
tempted to include a great many more insights from sociological and political science research). 
Secondly, it seems that the interest in a great variety of critical theories and theory development is a
natural inclination of the student in me. It is the student who finds motivation and inspiration in the
abstract, the theoretical, the intellectually challenging. This is the logical, rational side in me that
strives to be reasonable and independent. This is also, in essence, the one that has been in a fairly
dominant position in the text so far, adhering to the norms of the dominant logico-scientific form of
writing. However, identities naturally overlap and intertwine. It is the activist that is deeply rooted
in real-life experiences and problems and brings in the normative, emancipatory aspect. It is from
this  experience  and  identity  base  that  the  contradictions  of  resistance  and  the  multiple
understandings  and  points  of  power,  resistance  and  politics  seem  particularly  reflective  of  a
complex 'reality'.  It is also from this point of view that the Transition model seems to reflect a
reasonable, although invariably incomplete, response to the crises of our times; it is practical in
terms of its modes of activity and practical in terms of recognising that governments are also needed
to prevent a number of apocalyptic futures. 
However, some of this also sits uneasily with the formative anarchist and feminist in me. To be
clear, I am not referring to the anarchism of chaos and violence, but to one of non-violence, mutual
aid and constructive direct action. And it is a feminism of holding all beings as equal and thus being
attentive to naturalised forms of domination and hierarchy. This is the side in me that does not agree
with Hobbesian or Lockean understandings of human nature as inherently competitive or rational,
but rather more those of Rousseau. And therefore the state and the interrelated competitiveness and
nationalism of  'imagined  communities'  sits  uneasily  with  my normative  understandings  of  the
world. It is from this identity and experience base that critical theories strike so important and the
trust  in governments  that shines through from the various materials written by Hopkins strike as
rather deluded. History certainly gives little indication that the key criticisms of the movement (e.g.
growth-oriented political economies) will be addressed in any meaningful way in the context of
institutional politics. Not unless they no longer have any other choice (which will be never). 
And this brings us to the realm of emotions. There is considerable anger in me about the state of the
world (or my perception of it). The little Finn that was raised to believe in benevolent governments
and social democratic values – but globally, unlike my more nationally orientated parents – has
been sorely disappointed. Thus, there is a profound anger that often rears its head – an anger about
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the blatant destruction of the Earth and the immense and incomprehensible inequalities within it.
Things are not helped by statistics that tell me that 85 of the richest people have as much wealth as
half  of  the  entire  human  population  (see  e.g.  Wearden  2014).  The  ensuing  conviction  that
governments are not the key to any fundamental changes towards greater human and planetary
wellbeing is the key reason for wanting to explore the Transition movement – people who seemed
to be building changes (however small they may be) rather than waiting for them. However, there
was also a deep and irrational sense of disappointment when the research material revealed the
movement's (well, Hopkins') continuing reliance on governments. What kind of strange mixture of
liberalism, anarchism, and collectivism?! It would take a lifetime of ethnographic research to work
out the real diversity of views, a time that I do not have.   
In this constellation of feelings and reactions, another emotion has also manifested itself; that of
guilt.  It  is related to the Eurocentric,  middle class aspect of this thesis  – namely the choice to
examine the Transition movement rather than some other, non-Western example of movements that
represent a fairly holistic criticism of and long-term solutions to the crises of our times.48 I have
particularly begun to associate the white,  happy face of Rob Hopkins with Eurocentric,  middle
class, environmental activism that, honestly speaking, often strikes as highly annoying. This may
not be a fair assessment, and I am similarly implicated in these very same characteristics (even
though I do not identify myself as middle class or specifically as an environmental activist, I am
certain that some others might), but they nonetheless cause me considerable uneasiness. The same
goes for the sheer amount of optimism embodied in the works of Hopkins. Yes, optimism is no
doubt a powerful tool in motivating people and perhaps one of the greatest lesson contained in the
Transition model, but it is so very hard to be optimistic without being blissfully ignorant (which I
do not think Hopkins is). There are so many obstacles in our way. Beyond the prevalence of self-
centred and self-entitled attitudes, it is even difficult to try and live ecologically in your personal
life,  because all  basic everyday necessities that are organic,  local,  biodegradable and so on are
usually ridiculously expensive unless you actually grow everything yourself. It is enough to make
you want to scream. And sometimes I do. But I also try to rise above it and look at the negatives
and the positives. This is a crucial ability for staying sane and it is this the very same ability that is
reflected in the critical-hermeneutic approach chosen for this thesis. Balancing empathy and critique
is the key to avoiding both overt idealism and overt pessimism. 
48 One potential would have been to examine the philosophy of Buen Vivir (the good life), prevalent in among many
social movements in Latin America (see e.g. Gudynas 2011). 
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Overall, it is clear that although I did not begin this thesis with the intent of making it some kind of
identity project, it  has invariably become one. On the other hand, this is hardly a surprise; this
exploration has certainly demonstrated the embeddedness of one's values and worldviews in most of
our choices, including those related to research components. Another question altogether concerns
the role that these deeply personal aspects play in the interpretation itself. Where is the line between
the researcher and the 'object' of research? For example, did I make the Transition movement into
something that I wanted it to be? Did I find the movement as promoting collectivism because of my
own egalitarian and collectivist inclinations? Certainly someone else could have ignored some of
the issues that I raised. Similarly, I did not address a lot of the issues and theoretical perspectives
that other researchers have focused on. I have had the power to include or exclude. But surely this is
matter of the overall research framework – the particular questions, theories, methods, and research
materials – which are different for each researcher. Furthermore, although my interpretations are
inevitably  informed  by my own  understandings  and  experience  base49,  they  are  by  no  means
arbitrary. Again the critical-hermeneutic approach and the variety of perspectives employed enabled
me to ask questions rather than try and fit the movement into a single viewpoint or argument (of
course, treating the movement as an instance of the politics of resistance was a particular viewpoint
and  argument  in  itself).  These  also  allowed  for  the  messy  and  incomplete  character  of  the
movement and of resistance overall to come to light, rather than constructing overly romantic ideas
of either. It is actually notable that such romanticism was perhaps present in my original research
plan, but it has more or less evaporated in the course of this thesis. Some of the striking differences
between  the  early  hypothesis  presented  in  the  research  plan  and  the  actual  analysis  are  in
themselves a clear indication of the 'integrity' of this thesis. Indeed, although many of my choices
clearly reflect the green Marxist / anarchist / feminist within (Marxist inclinations being manifested
in the view that economic relations play a key role in almost all aspects of life), I did not find or
present the movement narrative as the perfect counterpart.
  
Overall, it is notable that I have tried to do justice to what Ackerley and True (2008) consider as 'the
feminist  research  ethic'.  This  has  involved  being  attentive  to  the  power  of  epistemology,  to
49 For example, my interpretation of the difficulties in appealing to 'normal' people through references to politics is
highly informed by personal experience rather than academic knowledge. A very close example is my (Australian)
husband; he votes (as most Australians do) and has a certain acceptance of the way that national and international
politics operate,  but  he finds 'politics' to be essentially an uninviting realm of party politics and bureaucracies,
separate from his own life. Similarly, often when meeting someone for the first time and telling them that I am
studying  international  politics,  their  reaction  is  less  than  flattering.  More  often  than  not,  they  seem  either
overwhelmed or uninterested as if to say (in either case) “oh my god, how do you have the energy?”. Thus, these
people clearly associate politics and political with the bureaucracies of states and parties and, for the most part,
consider them external  to their everyday lives.  Trying to appeal such people to action thus requires a different
approach, a different vocabulary altogether. 
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boundaries and marginalisations, to relationship of power, and my own situatedness as a researcher
in all of these. In the last instance it is the reader who interprets my work anew and determines
whether s/he has been persuaded by the arguments presented. 
7. CONCLUSIONS
In light of the multiple,  interrelated and in many ways global ecological,  economic,  social  and
political crises, there is clearly a need for a fundamental rethink of the way that we think, behave,
organise  ourselves  on  this  planet.  It  was  the  purpose  of  this  thesis  to  examine  one  existing
alternative of how we could organise ourselves and our economies in potentially 'postcapitalist'
ways  (a  practical  point)  and  to  use  this  qualitative  case  study  as  a  way  to  broaden  IR's
understanding  of  social  movements  and  critical  theory  conceptualisations  of  the  politics  of
resistance (a theoretical point). Furthermore, a third aspect has also played a key role in this thesis,
that of methodology and the boundaries of IR. In terms of research questions, these interrelated
concerns were translated into the following questions: 1)  What are the core criticisms, strategies
and solutions embodied in the Transition narrative; 2) How is the Transition movement a form of
politics of resistance and how can this case study help to advance IR's understanding of social
movements  and the  politics  of  resistance;  and  3)  How does  my own identity  and positionality
interact with the research? 
The  key  findings  of  the  empirical  analysis  (chapter  four)  were  that  the  movement  narrative
embodies  deep criticisms of  particular  socio-cultural  and (socio-)economic  structures  related  to
Western modernity (i.e. individualistic, materialistic, and anthropocentric values, and the globalised,
energy-intensive,  and growth-based economic system),  and the inaction of political  elites.  As a
response, it pursues what can be fittingly termed as the optimistic diplomacy of transitional change
towards economic localisation and the spread of cooperative forms of production;  intrinsic  and
Earth-centred  (biocentric)  values  and  worldviews;  and  the  reconciliation  of  community
empowerment and state action. More theoretically (chapter five), the movement represents 'covert',
everyday resistance  to  some core  aspects  of  globalisation,  capitalism,  scientific  rationality,  and
modern masculinity. A key method of resistance is transforming aspects of popular common sense
through principled pragmatism and positive direct action (termed as 'pragmatic prefigurativism').
The imaginary that emerges is one of place-based globalism, described most tellingly as 'a global
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politics of local transformations'.  However,  rather than being the perfect counterpart  of each of
these perspectives and concepts, a key insight of the analysis concerned the multifaceted and often
contradictory nature of resistance. This complexity and variety (including the local yet transnational
character, the diverse, non-confrontational methods, and the emphasis on the slow transformation of
everyday  economic  and  social  practices  and  mindsets)  also  contained  the  key  to  broadening
common understandings of social movements and the politics of resistance within the discipline of
International  Relations.  Accepting  such  a  movement  as  a  natural  part  of  IR  research  requires
embracing  broader  understandings  of  politics,  resistance,  and  power,  but  surely  this  is  to  be
welcomed. It is exclusion rather than inclusion that should raise cause for concern over the purposes
and boundaries of IR. Turning a blind eye to the world political importance of social movements in
their multiple forms, methods, targets, and locations would only serve to prolong our lack of regard
for and understanding of  potential sources of radical change.     
Finally, the personal narrative in chapter six revealed a deep connection between some key aspects
of the research and my own identity and positionality, thus demonstrating the embeddedness of
values and worldviews in most of our research choices. It also highlighted the benefits of using
theoretically holistic and methodologically critical-reflective tools, which allowed to draw strength
from particular aspects of identity and personality. The narrative also brought to attention some
potentially unresolved feelings (e.g. anger, disappointment, guilt) relating to the research, issues
which were not explicit in the analyses in chapters four and five. Although reflected throughout the
research, this part was a more pronounced move "away from assuming the stance of disinterested
spectator and toward assuming the posture of feeling, embodied and vulnerable observer" (Bochner
2001, 135). A key purpose of this chapter was to disrupt more clearly the assumption of a distanced
spectator and thereby question the necessity of holding such an ideal at all. Indeed, although the
three different analyses focused on three different aspects of the research, my own subjectivity,
personality,  identity,  and  experience  and  knowledge  base,  were  embodied  in  all  of  them.  The
position as an 'embodied observer' did not therefore prevent me from producing valid knowledge of
the topic in question.
Overall,  the broader implications underlying this  thesis concern the purposes and boundaries of
International Relations as a discipline. To be clear,  I have not tried to argue for the exclusion of
mainstream perspectives, whether related to our topics of study (ontology), our conceptions of what
constitutes knowledge (epistemology), or our understanding of the contours of 'scientific' research
(methodology). I have rather wanted to raise questions and to draw attention to the legitimacy of a
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variety  of  multidisciplinary  topics,  viewpoints  and  methods  within  IR.  This  is  a  politics  of
prefigurative resistance that  strives  for  a  less  hierarchical  and more inclusive IR. Many people
might argue that IR is already inclusive and multidisciplinary, but this certainly does not reflect my
personal  experiences  at  Tampere  University.  Indeed,  my  time  at  university  has  often  been
characterised  by  the  continuous  construction  of  disciplinary  dichotomies,  boundaries,  and
exclusions which have played a crucial role in the contours of this thesis. 
Therefore, in terms of the research topic (which many have interrogated as not entirely suitable for
IR research), I have wanted to raise questions about the purpose of IR, because it is our purposes,
more than anything, that should draw the limits of our subject matter. It is clear that the purpose
driving this research is  critical,  yet emancipatory;  it concerns finding and interrogating ways to
improve global wellbeing (without arguing for universal solutions).  In this view, 'international' is
interchangable  with  'global'  or  'transnational'  while  'politics'  and  'relations'  contain  multiple
meanings. This is not about the exlusion of states or state-centric IR, but the broadening of our
horizons also beyond states and state-centric research. Through my theoretical choices, I have also
wanted to draw attention to the partial and located nature of all knowledge claims and the benefits
of more collective, reflective, and holistic viewpoints. Methodologically, the focus has been in the
various  boundaries,  marginalisations  and  relationships  of  power,  and  the  situatedness  of  the
researcher. The combination of methods, based on narrative methodology, were intended to question
hierarchical conceptualisations of science and knowledge, including the purpose of maintaining a
dichotomy  between  perspectives  that  'explain'  and  those  that  'understand'.  Understanding  is  a
prerequisite for explaining (in any meaning of the terms) and therefore their separation into distinct
methodological schools strikes as questionable. It reflects the micro-politics of the discipline and, as
such, invites resistance. 
It is of course also notable that the divide between problem-solving theories and critical theories is a
dichotomy that I have maintained, despite its clear connection to explaining and understanding.
However, while the former pair relates more strongly to the purposes of research and is inclusionary
in nature, the latter pair relates to the legitimacy of research and is arguably more exclusionary.
Thus, I am not arguing for the removal of all dichotomies per se, but for the questioning of their
origins and purposes. Furthermore, I have also criticised the position of the distant observer and yet,
I have carried out this entire research without ever witnessing a single Transition initiative. I have
also  only included the  'view from the  top',  meaning the  works  of  Hopkins  and the  Transition
Network  rather  than  voices  of  actual  participants  (although  Hopkins  and  the  members  of  the
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Transition Network are participants of the first Transition initiative in Totnes, UK). However, these
choices have been based on practical constrainst  of time and resources  rather than on personal
preferences per se. Moving on, it would interesting to carry out further research into the diversity,
rather than unity, of movement narratives. Another likely prospect for further research would be to
start a Transition initiative in my own locality and thereby carry out participatory action research.
Further research could also utilise theories of performative resistance (see e.g.  Kulynych 1997)
which have some considerable similarities between prefigurative perspectives. Most notably, both
arguably represent a form of resistance and identity- and world-making with the purpose of re-
creation (see Kulynych 1997, 335–336). 
Either  way,  increasing  IR's  understanding  of  radical  change  will  most  likely  require  a
multidisciplinary approach – something that should be viewed as an opportunity rather than a threat.
A core weakness of this thesis has perhaps been the fact that sociological and political science
research has not been considered enough as these certainly have much to offer. However, it would
have been difficult to extend the theoretical framework even further without risking its coherence.
Therefore, further dialogue between (critical) IR and various strands of social movement research is
a task reserved for another day.   
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